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I. INTRODUCTION
In this modern tale of Robin Hood, Robin Hood invalidates drug
patents from the rich and gives to the poor, to himself, and to other rich
people.1 That is the reputation that hedge fund 2 manager Kyle Bass3 and
his hedge fund subsidiary, the Coalition for Affordable Drugs (CFAD),
have garnered.4 In January 2015 Kyle Bass declared war on the
pharmaceutical industry by making it his goal to challenge and invalidate
what he calls their “BS patents” through inter partes review (IPR).5 Kyle
Bass and CFAD own no patents and produce no products, yet IPR rules
allow him and others, sans Article III standing, to challenge a
pharmaceutical patent’s validity. 6 Big Pharma7 claims that Kyle Bass’s

* J.D. June 2017, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois, Professional Master in
Biology July 2013, The Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois, Master in Public
Health May 2010, Benedictine University, Lisle, Illinois, B.S. in Health Science August 2008,
Benedictine University, Lisle, Illinois. This comment would not have been possible without
the unconditional support and love from the love of my life, Beth, and my family, Gina,
Pancho, and Jessica. Thank you for always being there for me.
1. Kyle Bass views himself as the “Robin Hood of the modern world” and claims his plan
to challenge drug patents to lower drug prices and health care costs is “a rare example of
hedge funds aligning themselves with the public good.” Mark Melvin, Kyle Bass Wants to Be
the Robin Hood of Drug Prices, VALUEWALK (Jan. 7, 2015, 4:30 PM), www.valuewalk.com
/2015/01/kyle-bass-wants-robin-hood-drug-prices.
2. Hedge funds “are alternative investments using pooled funds that may use a number
of different strategies in order to earn active return, or alpha, for their investors.” Hedge
Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/h/AIAhedgefund.asp.
3. Kyle Bass is the founder and head of a hedge fund called Hayman Capital Management
LP. Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent, Short the
Stock, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-kylebass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408. In 2007, Mr. Bass successfully
predicted the subprime mortgage meltdown and earned 212% return by betting on the
short of the subprime mortgages. Id. In January 2015, Kyle Bass formed his subsidiary, the
Coalition for Affordable Drugs (hereinafter CFAD), which he uses to challenge and invalidate
drug patents to lower drug prices for the public. Id.
4. See Mark Melvin, supra note 1.
5. Julia La Roche, Hedge Fund Manager Kyle Bass Is Going After Big Pharma and Its ‘BS
Patents,’ BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2015, 10:47 AM), www.businessinsider.com/kyle-bassgoing-after-us-pharma-2015-1.
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 311.
7. The name “Big Pharma” is used in this comment to generally refer to the
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motivation is far from altruistic and that he is simply abusing the IPR
process to get rich by negatively influencing pharmaceutical stocks when
his IPR challenges to those specific drug patents become public. 8 Kyle
Bass counters by professing to use the IPR process to attack wrongly
validated patents to lower drug costs for the public. 9 Whatever Kyle
Bass’s true motivation may be, it is undeniable that his novel way of using
IPR is contrary to what was intended when the America Invents Act (AIA)
of 201110 was enacted.11
While some have clamored for IPR to carry an Article III standing
requirement12 and others have suggested making IPR rules parallel to
stricter federal court standards, 13 the drug industry has asked Congress
to exempt14 it from IPR proceedings altogether, arguing that its drug
pharmaceutical industry as a whole but it has referred to specific pharmaceutical groups.
See generally Big Pharma Manufacturers, DRUG WATCH, www.drugwatch.com/manufacturer
(last modified May 12, 2017, 3:30:43 PM). “Big Pharma is the nickname given to the world’s
vast and influential pharmaceutical industry and its trade group, the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America or PhRMA. These powerful companies make
billions of dollars every year by selling drugs and medical devices.” Id.
8. Lisa Shuchman, Big Pharma: Let’s Shift Patent Debate Away from Trolls, CORP. COUNS.
(May 20, 2015), www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202726911929/Big-Pharma-Lets-Shift-Pate
nt-Debate-Away-From-Trolls#ixzz3lSTCWgDD. Discussing the concern over alleged IPR
abuse in the pharmaceutical industry, Big Pharma claims Kyle Bass’s use of IPRs by betting
on the short of a stock for financial gain is an abuse of process that was never intended by
Congress when it passed the American Invents Act in 2011. Id.
9. See Mark Melvin, supra note 1. Kyle Bass claims that the pharmaceutical industry has
kept drug prices high and generic manufacturers out of the market by using patent law
loopholes. Id.
10. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 et seq. (2013). The AIA, a federal statute signed into law by Former President Barack
Obama, was designed to “modernize the U.S. patent system and strengthen America’s
competitiveness in the global economy.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Implementation,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/leahy-smith-a
merica-invents-act-implementation (last visited May 5, 2017). The AIA was enacted in 2011,
some 221 years after the first Patent Act was passed. See generally Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat.
109 (1790).
11. See Gene Quinn, Inter Partes Review and the Controversial Implications of the Kyle
Bass petitions, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 15, 2015), www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/09/15/interpartes-review-and-the-controversial-implications-of-the-kyl-e-bass-peti-tio-ns/id=-61691
(stating it is “undeniable that Congress did not intend for hedge fund billionaires to
challenge drug patents using [IPR]. It is equally undeniable that the law clearly does allow
for anyone, including hedge fund billionaires, to challenge patents they believe were
improvidently granted.”).
12. Lionel M. Lavenue, R. Benjamin Cassady & Michael Liu Su, A Review of Patent Bills in
the 114th Congress, LAW 360 (June 15, 2015, 11:08 PM), www.law360.com/articles/6646
70/a-review-of-patent-bills-in-the-114th-congress.
13. Peter J. Pitts, Patent ‘Death Squads’ v. Innovation, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2015, 7:23 PM),
www.wsj.com/articles/patent-death-squads-vs-innovation-1433978591. The Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (PTAB) uses softer standards than federal courts, for example, PTAB
follows the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in contrast to the “clear and
convincing” standard the federal court system uses to determine a patent’s validity. Id. This
has led to former Chief Judge Randall Rader of the Federal Circuit to call PTAB a potential
patent death squad. Id.
14. Mathew Bultman, Pharma Lobby Wants Some Patents Exempt from AIA Review, LAW
360 (July 16, 2015, 7:43 PM), www.law360.com/articles/680005/pharma-lobby-wants-
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patents are already subject to a patent invalidating process under the
Hatch-Waxman Act.15 The prevailing fear is that IPR may render HatchWaxman litigation useless.16 The Big Pharma lobbyists, in their argument
for exemption from IPR, stated that IPR could destroy the development of
new drugs: “These challenges take money away from research and
development of new medicines, ultimately hurting the patient.” 17 Also,
Big Pharma has argued that there is no evidence that IPRs will bring
generics faster to the pharmaceutical market place and at lower prices. 18
But, pro-generic drug lobbyists and Medicare lobbyists vehemently
oppose pharmaceutical exemption from IPR. 19 In letters to Congress,
Medicare lobbyists wrote, “Soaring prescription drug prices threaten to
undermine their stability and an [inter partes review] carve-out for brand
drug manufacturers would only make matters worse.” 20 Medicare
lobbyists argued that IPRs are a useful, quick, and inexpensive alternative
to litigation for generic companies to invalidate bad pharmaceutical
patents to get their generic product on the market. 21
Whether Kyle Bass’s IPR challenges are meritless or an abuse of IPR,
his stated reasons for challenging drug patents are not completely off
base. His criticisms of the drug industry bring focus on its questionable
practices to maintain high profits. In 2014, Americans spent
approximately one thousand dollars per person per year on
pharmaceuticals, more than any other country in the world. 22 That
number has increased 13.1% in 2015.23 Further, the drug industry has
taken some hits to its reputation because of these high drug prices. From
a former CEO increasing the drug price of an already available medication
by 5,000%24 to a drug company increasing the price of an EpiPen from
some-patents-exempt-from-aia-review.
15. Id.; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984). Commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act. Construction and
Application of Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 and 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e) (1994)), 180 A.L.R. Fed. 487, 2a. The
Act is known as the Hatch-Waxman Act because of its two co-sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch
and Representative Henry Waxman. Id.
16. See Gene Quinn, Senators Mistaken, IPRs Do Not Frustrate Hatch-Waxman, IP
WATCHDOG (June 4, 2015), www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/06/04/senators-mistaken-iprs-donot-frustrate-hatch-waxman/id=58397.
17. See Bultman, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. See Mathew Bultman, Medicare Group Opposes Carveout for Drug Patents, LAW 360
(Sept. 22, 2015, 8:11 PM), www.law360.com/articles/705730/medicare-group-opposes-ca
rveout-for-drug-patents.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Valerie Paris, Why Do Americans Spend So Much on Pharmaceuticals?, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Feb. 7, 2014, 12:15 PM), www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/americans-spend-much-ph
armaceuticals.
23. Pharmaceutical Pricing: Crippling, THE ECONOMIST (June 4, 2015), www.econ
omist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/06/pharmaceutical-pricing.
24. Meghana Keshavan, Revenge of the Hoodie: Marti Shkreli Fires Back at the Drug
Industry, STAT (Jan. 23, 2017), www.statnews.com/2017/01/23/shkreli-revenge-drug-ind
ustry.
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$57 a shot to more than $600 for a two-pack,25 the drug industry has
garnered a reputation that cares more about profits than patient
healthcare.26 What has helped fuel this profit mongering are drug
companies that employ generic drug blocking strategies such as reverse
payment agreements and product hopping, both, which opponents argue,
unfairly extends a drug patents term and keeps drug prices high. 27 These
practices can keep drugs expensive and inaccessible. 28
In a drug patent system that is currently flawed, logical HatchWaxman reform may be the compromise needed to foster drug
innovation but also keep drug prices fair. Part II of this comment provides
background information on how new drugs get approved by the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration29 (FDA) and the process for approving generic
drugs through the Hatch-Waxman Act. Then a short explanation of how a
patent is obtained and how they can be challenged under the new IPR
process. After a discussion of reverse payment agreements and product
hopping, this section will also look at Kyle Bass’s IPR strategy and how it
could affect the drug industry. Finally, this last part of the background
section will look at the drug industry’s response to Kyle Bass’s IPR use
and their request IPR exemption.
Part III begins by comparing the pros and cons of the Hatch-Waxman
process of invalidating drug patents to how IPR operates. Then, IPR
statistics on patent invalidation rates will be examined, in particular the
statistics that pertain to bio/pharma patents. Next, an analysis of the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB’s) review of some of Kyle Bass’s

25. David McLaughlin, Sara Forden, and Jared S. Hopkins, Mylan Faces U.S. Antitrust
Investigation on Epipen, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2017, 2:14 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/ar
ticles/2017-01-30/mylan-faces-u-s-antitrust-investigation-on-epipen-practices.
26. See Ed Silverman, Drug Industry Ad Campaign May Be Too Late to Save Its Reputation,
STAT (Jan. 23, 2017), www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2017/01/23/phrma-ad-campaign-dr
ug-industry (“[A] new Harris Poll reported that only 9 percent of Americans believe drug
makers place more value on patients than profits.”). Id.
27. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44222, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT-ANTITRUST:
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND PRODUCT HOPPING 1 (2015). Under a reverse payment
agreement, a brand-name pays a generic brand to not compete by “neither challeng[ing] the
brand-name’s patent nor sell[ing] a generic version of the patented drug for a period of
time.” Id. Product Hopping involves the practice of releasing a “new patent-protected
version of existing drugs—while simultaneously discontinuing an earlier drug that is near
patent expiration—with the primary goal of delaying generic entry into the marketplace.”
Id.
28. See Amy Nordrum, Drug Prices: World’s Most Expensive Medicine Costs $440,000 a
Year, but Is It Worth the Expense?, IB TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016, 8:37 AM), www.ibtimes.com/
drug-prices-worlds-most-expensive-medicine-costs-440000-year-it-worth-expense2302609 (finding that a drug that treats rare blood disorders costs $400,000, cancer
therapies can cost up to $100,000 per year, and hepatitis C drugs can cost up to $94,500 per
treatment).
29. The Food and Drug Administration, an agency of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, was created to protect the public health “by ensuring the safety,
efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical
devices; and ensuring the safety of our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that
emit radiation.” About FDA: What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ASS’N, www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/default.htm (last visited May 30, 2017).
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challenges and the overall success rate of these challenges will show that
drug patent exemption from IPR is excessive. Part IV proposes that logical
Hatch-Waxman reform, rather than IPR exemption, is needed to solve the
current issues involving the drug industry. This includes incorporating a
new IPR-type challenge into the Hatch-Waxman system and creating a
new regulatory regime to punish Act violators. The purpose of this
proposal, in reforming the Hatch-Waxman Act, is to create a system that
is fair system for both drug companies and consumers alike. Overall, its
goal is to do for the Hatch-Waxman Act what the AIA did for patent law:
modernize it for the 21st century.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The FDA, the Process for Approving New Drugs, and
Generic Drugs Entry under the Hatch-Waxman Act
1.

The FDA and Approving New Drugs

The FDA, along with the rules set by the Hatch-Waxman Act,30
regulate the manufacture and distribution of pharmaceutical drugs.31 The
FDA ensures, through a lengthy process, that prospective drug meet strict
safety and efficacy standards.32 If a drug is worth pursuing after these
safety and efficacy tests, the drug maker files an Investigational New Drug
Application (IND) to the FDA.33 If, after reviewing the IND for thirty days,
the FDA approves the application, the drug manufacturer can begin
testing the drug through physician supervision at hospitals and other
approved medical facilities.34 If the FDA finds that the IND data shows the
drug is safe for humans, clinical trials can begin. 35 Thereafter, if the drug
30. The Hatch-Waxman Act, or the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act, amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to allow fairness in competition between
brand name drug companies and generic brand companies. See generally Martha M.
Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical Scales
Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supple
ment/2009/genericsupplement0809/generic-hatchwaxman-0809. The Hatch-Waxman
protects a brand name company’s patented drug while giving a generic company an
opportunity to work on creating a generic version of the patented drug through an
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) without infringing on the patented drug. Id.
31. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (2012).
32. JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 7 (2d ed. 2011) (stating that to test if a
drug is effective and reasonably safe for humans, the drug must pass several phases of
preclinical evaluation like laboratory tests on tissue cell culture, computer based analysis,
and live animals to determine if a drug has an effect on a disease or symptoms of the
disease).
33. Id. An IND application contains the drug’s chemical composition, pre-clinical study
data, the drug’s intended use, and full description of all of the testing to ensure the drug is
safe and effective. Id.
34. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.23, 312.40(b) (2016). The Institutional Review Board (IRB)
provides oversight to the human testing by evaluating the ethical aspects of the study.
THOMAS, supra note 32, at 7.
35. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 8. Phase I helps determine toxicity levels and clinical
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passes three phases of clinical trials, the drug manufacturer must then
comply with the Hatch-Waxman Act and file a New Drug Application
(NDA) with the FDA for evaluation.36 If approved, the drug manufacturer
may market the drug to the public.37 As a reward for complying with the
Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA grants the NDA holder marketing exclusivity
and data exclusivity for its new drug, depending on the new drug’s
categorization.38 All approved NDAs are listed in the FDA’s “Orange Book”
of federally approved drugs.39 From inception to market, on average it
takes twelve years and $350 million for a new drug to reach consumers. 40
During pre-clinical testing of the drug, or as early in the clinical trial
testing as possible, the drug manufacturer must file a patent application
to avoid forfeiting potential patent rights as a result of a one-year
statutory bar.41 This is important because there is uncertainty in the law
concerning when a pharmaceutical company’s actions, in complying with
FDA regulations to receive drug-marketing approval, will be considered

dosage range; Phase II determines if the drug is effective or not; Phase III involves testing
the drug in controlled and uncontrolled studies to determine the drug’s secondary effects
or side effects to particular portions of the population. Id.
36. Id. FDA officials have 180 days to do their own tests on the drug’s safety; checking
the phase trials data and conducting inspections to ensure the drug is manufactured
properly. Id. If they approve the NDA, the drug is monitored through a “Med Watch”
surveillance program or Phase IV studies to acquire additional information to determine the
drug’s long-term safety and efficacy. Id. An NDA application also requires the filer to include
patent application information. Id.
37. Id.
38. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (New Drug Product Exclusivity). Orphan Drugs exclusivity
(ODE) is seven years, New Chemicals exclusivity is five years, “other” exclusivity is three
years, pediatric exclusivity is six months added to an existing patent term or exclusivity, and
Abbreviated New Drug Applications, if approved, receive 180 days of exclusivity. U.S. FOOD
AND DRUG ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON PATENTS AND EXCLUSIVITY (last updated Dec.
5, 2016), www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm#How%2
0long%20does%20an%20applicant%20holder%20have%20to%20submit%20patent
%20information?. As part of the deal for brand name drug manufacturers to receive market
exclusivity of new drugs, brand name drug manufacturers must participate in the HatchWaxman Act so that generic companies can rely on the safety and efficacy data of a brand
name company’s NDA. Id. The brand name drug companies also receive a period of data
exclusivity and patent term extension based on agency delays of NDA approval. THOMAS,
supra note 32, at 4 (citing EDWIN MANSFIELD, PATENTS AND INNOVATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, 2
MANAGEMENT SCI. 13 (Feb. 1986)).
39. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 8. Both NDA approved brand name drugs and approved
generic drugs are listed in the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, which is also known as the “Orange Book” of FDA-approved drugs. Id.
40. New Drug Approval Process, DRUGS.COM, www.drugs.com/fda-approval-process.html
(last modified May 3, 2017). Phase I takes one year, Phase II takes two years, Phase III takes
three years, and finally, the FDA takes two-and-a-half years to review an NDA. Id.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). Section 102(b) denies a patent if the invention was
“patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use
or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the” filing date of the U.S. patent
application. Id. The inventor can trigger these activities or by other activities performed by
others. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 123. “Pharmaceutical firms would do well to coordinate
the timing of their clinical trials and patent filings as closely as possible.” Id. at 138.
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experimental use42 or a trigger for a section 102 statutory bar. 43 In
addition to being granted a twenty-year monopoly on the patent drug, a
pharmaceutical company may receive an extension on the patent term
based on the delays associated with FDA regulations. 44
2.

The Hatch-Waxman Act, ANDA Litigation, and Generic Drugs

Prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, it was very
complicated and difficult for brand name drug companies to obtain both
a patent and FDA marketing approval of a new drug. 45 But, the process
was even harder for generic drug companies that wanted to introduce
unpatented, generic version of drugs into the marketplace.46 In the 1980s,
if generic companies wanted to introduce their own formulations of an
existing drug, they had to undergo the same FDA NDA procedures that a
brand name drug had already completed. 47 This brought about a conflict
between patent law and the FDA because a generic company would be
liable for patent infringement merely for conducting the necessary
experimentation required to satisfy and complete an NDA for the FDA
prior to the termination of a drug patent’s period of exclusivity.48
42. See KENNETH L. DORSNEY ET AL., ANDA LITIGATION: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LITIGATORS 3 (2012).
43. See Eli Lily & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals Inc., 471 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (rejecting that a drug’s clinical trials constituted public use because the trials had
experimental purposes based on the testing on healthy volunteers, experimenters
restrictions, security, monitoring, and secrecy of the trials); contra SmithKline Beecham
Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that “an experimental use
negates a statutory bar when the inventor was testing claimed features of the invention,”
thus testing a drugs primary intended use, efficacy and safety for FDA approval does not
constitute experimental use.), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), on remand,
403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (avoiding the experimental use issue and decided that the
patent was invalid by inherent anticipation); see City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson
Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877) (finding that if the use of the invention is for experimental
purposes to find the inventions best embodiment, then this use is not considered public use
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)); accord EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafter Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“This Court has repeatedly stressed that evidence of experimental use . . . operates
to negate the application of section 102(b)[.]”). Id.; compare In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135
(Fed Cir. 1983) (ruling that if the predominant purpose of the testing of an invention is to
predict if an invention will be successful in the marketplace, that testing will not constitute
experimentation under the experimental use doctrine).
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012). Patent holder is entitled to one half the time starting from
the IND testing and the submission of NDA, and in addition, the time spent by the FDA to
approve the NDA. Id. The extension must not exceed five years. Id. Ordinarily, a patent term
lasts twenty years. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
45. See Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860–61 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (determining if generic firm infringed brand name firm’s pharmaceutical patent
because it conducted FDA-required premarketing tests of a generic version of the drug
patent six months before patent term ended).
46. Id.
47. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 10.
48. Id.; See Roche Products, 733 F.2d at 863–64 (concluding that the defendants
committed patent infringement because their testing of a patented drug was for “business
reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry”
and thus was not experimental use).
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This scenario forced generic drug companies to wait for a patented
drug’s twenty-year monopoly to end just to be able to begin drug
experimentation and to file an NDA. 49 In addition to FDA regulation
delays in processing a generic company’s NDA, these delays would also
inadvertently give a brand name drug company an extension on their
patent past the statutory term allowed. 50 In response to this problem,
Congress passed amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act called the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.51 The Hatch-Waxman Act
was meant to “strike a balance between two potentially competing policy
interests, inducing pioneering development of pharmaceutical
formulations and methods, and facilitating efficient transition to a market
with low-cost, generic copies of those pioneering inventions at the close
of a patent term.”52 Paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act “streamlines”
a generic drug’s market entry by allowing the generic drug to rely on the
brand name drug’s NDA safety and efficacy data.53 This process is called
an Abbreviated New Drug Application, or ANDA.54
All ANDA applications require (1) bioequivalence data,55
(2) certification, and (3) notice to the patent owner of the patented drug
that the generic drug company has filed an ANDA for a generic version of
the patented drug.56
a. Identical Active Ingredient and Bioequivalence to the NDA
For the bioequivalence requirement, a generic drug company must
prove through corroborative data that its new drug is therapeutically
equivalent to a previously approved new drug, namely “that the same
generic drug will function in the same manner if the two drugs are
identical.”57 Part of the benefit of this process is that a generic drug
company can rely on the safety and efficacy testing of the patented drugs

49. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 10–11. The FDA regulatory delays to get NDA approval
delayed generic drug entry, which extended a drug company’s patent on a drug. Id.
50. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 11.
51. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in relevant part at 21 U.S.C. § 355
and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)) as amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). Congress concluded
“that the [Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] was cumbersome to the drug approval
process and delayed the entry of relatively inexpensive generic drugs into the market place.”
See Construction and Application of Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 15.
52. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(citing Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) rev’d on
other grounds, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3106 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2012) (No. 10-844).
53. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d at 1361. All the provisions related to the HatchWaxman Act and ANDA certification are codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b–68c, 70b; 21 U.S.C. §§
301, 355(j), 360cc; 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and 25 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282.
54. Id.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
56. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 10–24.
57. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 18.
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NDA application.58 The only scientific data a generic company must
supply is that the active ingredient59 in its generic drug is identical and is
the bioequivalent60 to the NDA drug to demonstrate that the generic drug
is just as safe and effective as the NDA drug. 61 This can save a generic
company millions of dollars associated with preclinical and clinical
studies.62 Other than these scientific requirements, the ANDA application
has to mirror the NDA regarding labeling, usage, dosage, route of
administration, and manufacturing information. 63
b. ANDA Certification Framework
This ANDA certification requirement is the most notable difference
between IPR and ANDA. As previously mentioned, the Hatch-Waxman Act
provides several exclusivity incentives to both generic and brand name
drug companies to spend money on creating and testing new drugs. 64 As
part of receiving the exclusivity benefit for participating in HatchWaxman litigation, an ANDA applicant and an NDA applicant agree to
participate in a framework that organizes a deliberate adversarial dispute
between generic companies and brand name companies, and generic
companies against other generic companies.65 This framework requires
an ANDA applicant to assert one of the following four certifications in its
ANDA application: (Paragraph I) the drug is not patented, (Paragraph II)
the patent on the drug has expired, (Paragraph III) the drug will not be
introduced into the market until after the twenty-year patent term of a
patented drug ends, or (Paragraph IV) there is no patent infringement or
the patent is invalid.66
58. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). An ANDA applicant does not have to submit any preclinical
or clinical testing data in an ANDA application. Id.
59. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 18. The active ingredient identity is used to determine the
similarity in the chemical composition of the generic drug and the NDA drug. Id. The active
ingredient of a generic drug is allowed to and is still considered identical to the NDA drug if
the generic drug has different physical characteristics than the NDA drug active ingredient.
Id.
60. Id. at 19. Bioequivalence of the NDA drug and generic drug is proven by showing
that the rate and extent the generic’s active ingredient, after ingestion or intravenous
injection, becomes available to the body or works on the intended active site in the body, is
the same as the NDA drug’s activity in the body. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. Calculations estimate that it can “cost more than $1 billion to bring one product
to the market, including approximately $50–840 million to bring treatments through the
stages of Basic Research/Drug Development and Pre-Clinical/Translational Research, and
approximately $50–970 million to complete the Clinical Trials (Phases 1, 2, and 3).” BRIGHT
FOCUS FOUND., FDA APPROVAL PROCESS (last modified Oct. 19, 2015, 5:01:17 PM), www.brigh
tfocus.org/clinical-trials/how-clinical-trials-work/fda-approval-process.
63. See DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 19.
64. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 4. For brand name drug companies, the FDA will promise
to delay the review or approval of a competing drug. Id.
65. Id.
66. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV) (2002); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12).
Generic companies who file under paragraphs I, II, and III do not trigger any patent
infringement repercussions because they do not challenge any patent rights. DORSNEY, supra
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When an ANDA applicant files a paragraph IV certification, the
ANDA applicant is (1) asserting that the generic drug does not violate the
NDA drug or (2) claiming the NDA’s patent is invalid. 67 Under the HatchWaxman Act, filing a paragraph IV certification is considered an
“artificial” act of patent infringement. 68 The “artificial infringement”
action is required to provide the patent holder with the Article III “case
or controversy” standing necessary to sue in federal court.69 This is the
“price” a generic company has to pay if it wants to receive the 180-day
market exclusivity reward from the FDA. 70 Essentially, paragraph IV was
designed for generic companies to aggressively introduce their generic
drug by attacking patented drugs they think are weak and potentially
vulnerable to an invalidity challenge.71
c. ANDA Notification to the NDA Holder and Adjudication
When a generic drug company files an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification for FDA approval, the generic company is required, within
twenty days after filing the ANDA, to notify the drug patent owner that an
ANDA challenge was made against their drug. 72 If the drug patent owner
does not respond or file suit against the ANDA applicant within forty-five
days of receiving notice of the ANDA’s paragraph IV challenge, the ANDA
applicant can file a motion in court for the entry of a declaratory judgment
for patent invalidity or noninfringement. 73 If the drug patent holder sues
the ANDA applicant within the forty-five-day window, the drug patent
note 42, at 30 n.51.
67. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 30.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2016).
69. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 10. The “safe harbor” provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act
prevents patent owner from suing generic drug manufacturers for using the patent in their
clinical experiments and studies. Id. Justiciability issues would arise in the form of a lack of
standing if the patent owner sued the generic company and so the Hatch-Waxman Act makes
the filing of an ANDA an act of infringement and gives the patent owner standing to resolve
their issues in federal court. Id.; see generally Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212
F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
70. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 22. The first generic company to file a paragraph IV
certification has a 180-day market exclusivity against all other generic companies that filed
later ANDAs. Id. Even more beneficial, is that the first generic to file a paragraph IV
certification is entitled to the 180-day market exclusivity regardless if the ANDA applicant
wins or loses its litigation case against the NDA/patent holder. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V.
v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
71. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 22.
72. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA). Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). The ANDA applicant must give notice of a paragraph IV
certification that the generic company is seeking to market the generic drug before a drug’s
patent term has ended. Id. The notice must also contain explanations, in detail, the facts and
legal reasons why the patent holder has an invalid patent or why the generic company’s
drug does not infringe the patent. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
73. MMA § 1101(a)(2)(C); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(i)(I); 35 U.S.C § 271(e)(5). Declaratory
judgment will be entered if the forty-five-day period has expired, the ANDA applicant was
not sued in court for patent infringement within the forty-five-day period, and the ANDA
applicant gave notice to the NDA/patent holder and offered confidential access to the ANDA
application in the notification. Id.
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holder has the benefit of the FDA staying approval of the ANDA
application for thirty months, pending litigation. 74 FDA ANDA approval
can occur in three scenarios: (1) the patent’s twenty-year term ends, (2)
a final federal court decision finds that the ANDA applicant’s drug did not
infringe the patent or that the patented drug is invalid,75 or (3) the FDA
mandated thirty-month stay ends.76 On average, the FDA takes eighteen
to twenty-four months to approve an ANDA application. 77 ANDA
applicants and drug patent holders prefer to that any litigation issues be
resolved and conclude within the thirty-month stay to forgo any
additional complicated matters.78

B. Patents and IPR
United States Patent law has undergone many changes in its two
hundred year history,79 but none greater than the passing of the AIA in
2011.80 The enactment of the AIA has been labeled “the most significant
overhaul to our patent system, since the founding fathers first conceived
of codifying a grand bargain between society and invention.” 81 PTAB, the
patent adjudicating agency, was created on September 16, 2012, one year
after President Obama signed the AIA into law. 82

74. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 14. The FDA requires strict compliance with the fortyfive-day period because if the NDA/patent holder does not respond the FDA may approve
the ANDA immediately despite any actual patent or exclusivity issues. Id. If the NDA/patent
owner sues, then the FDA will delay the ANDA approval for thirty months. Id.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii)(I). Thus, an NDA/patent owner can litigate an ANDA
challenge before the generic drug reaches the market. See e.g., Glaxo, Inc. v Novopharm, Ltd.,
110 F.3d 1562, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
76. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 15.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 77. NDA/patent holders prefer to delay generic entry as long as possible so if
it has a weak patent, it would prefer that litigation end as close the end of the thirty-month
stay, to keep the current market price on the branded drug as long as possible. Id. at 87. If
the NDA/patent holder has a strong claim, then it would seek a trial in hope of winning and
being granted an injunction against the introduction of the generic drug into the market
place. Generic companies prefer the opposite because the end of litigation in their favor
would activate the one of the three scenarios to end of the thirty-month stay and allow them
to introduce their drug to the market as soon as possible. Id. Litigating past the thirty-month
stays introduces complicated decisions regarding NDA/patent holders filing injunctions or
generic companies making the risk to market the drug with the possibility of facing an
injunction. Id.
79. See generally Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966) (stating
that patent law has been “amended, revised or codified 50 times since 1790.”).
80. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 et seq. (2013). See also text accompanying supra note 10.
81. David Kappos, Re-Inventing the U.S. Patent System, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: DAVID KAPPOS’S
PUBLIC BLOG (Sept. 16, 2011, 5:45 PM), www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/re_inventin
g_the_us_patent.
82. Gene Quinn, Inter Partes Review: Overview and Statistics, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 9, 2014),
www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/02/09/inter-partes-review-overview-andstatistics/id=47894.
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The AIA created vast changes in patent law, 83 including three brand
new patent reexamination procedures, 84 IPR being the most relevant of
those procedures.85 IPR, was created for two reasons: (1) to offer a
quicker and more cost-effective alternative to federal court litigation86
and (2) to replace IPR’s predecessor, the overly cumbersome inter partes
reexamination (IPX).87
The language of the AIA would incrementally come into effect—for
example IPRs were not available until PTAB was created. 88 Applying that
same incremental plan, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
announced that any patent application filed on or after March 16, 2013,
would be reviewed under the new AIA rules. 89 Pre-AIA, the substantive
patent law was mostly developed through the federal court system’s
interpretations of the 1952 Patent Act.90
1.

Patents, Novelty, and Obviousness

Patent law, in its ideal form, is a quid pro quo system that provides
inventors with a powerful and government-protected financial business

83. LEGAL PUB, THE NEW UNITED STATES PATENT LAW 7 (Black Line ed. 2011). United States
patent law transitioned from a first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system, it instituted
three brand new post-grant review proceedings, it allows third party submissions during
the examination of a patent application, and it replaces current interferences proceedings
with derivation proceedings among other changes. Id. The AIA also created PTAB to replace
the Board of Patent Appeals and Trial Interferences. Id.
84. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2013). Derivation proceedings, Covered Business Methods
(CBM), and Post-Grant Review (PGR) are the other new post-grant procedures that were
introduced when the AIA was enacted. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES
DISPUTES (last modified Apr. 2, 2013, 2:39 PM), www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-andregulations/america-invents-act-aia/inter-partes-disputes.
85. See Ryan Lynch & Peter Geier, New Patent Rules Pit Wall Street Against Big Pharma,
FORBES (Oct. 21, 2015, 1:07 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2015/10/21/newpatent-rules-pit-wall-st-against-big-pharma.
86. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 600–01 (commenting on the motivation behind creating IPR as an
alternative to patent litigation because, depending on the value of the challenged patent, the
average cost of patent litigation, including the costs of discovery, ranges between $500,000
and $3,995,000 per party).
87. See Robert Shang, Article, Inter Partes Reexamination and Improving Patent Quality,
7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 185 (2009) (“[O]ne should be aware that a hard-fought inter
partes reexamination between the patent owner and the challenger may take a long time to
complete.”). Id.
88. See Quinn, supra note 82.
89. USPTO announced that first to file patents applications that are filed on or after
March 16, 2013 will have the AIA substantive law applied to it. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, AMERICA INVENTS ACT EFFECTIVE DATES 6 (2011), www.uspto.gov/aia_implementati
on/aia-effective-dates.pdf.
90. See Sarah Tran, Article, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. TECH. 609, 616 (2012) (“The
Federal Circuit has developed for itself an enviable role in patent law. It has assumed
exclusive responsibility for making substantive interpretations of the Patent Act and has
historically chosen not to defer to agencies on issues of patent law.”) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Sapna Kumar, Article, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1547, 1550 (2011)).
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tool, in exchange for the inventors’ relinquishment of trade secret rights91
by fully disclosing their inventions’ workings for public knowledge and
future public use.92 Incentives in patent law, such as monetary gain,
motivate an inventor to file a patent for their invention. 93 If granted a
patent, the inventor has sole control over the patent through “a right to
exclude,” and can profit off of the patent through licenses, royalties or by
marketing and selling the invention. 94 However, it can cost thousands of
dollars to acquire a patent and, realistically, only 2%–10% of patents turn
a profit.95 For perspective, the drug industry spends close to $5 billion a
year in research and development to ensure it has an FDA-approved
drug.96
To acquire a patent, an inventor must satisfy five elements: (1) the
invention must be patentable,97 (2) the invention must be useful,98 (3) the
invention must be fully disclosed,99 (4) the invention must be novel, and
91. See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 155, 160–61, 165–67 (1989)
(discussing the relationship between patent law and trade secret law); see also Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493–94 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that
an inventor discloses their invention for patent protection in exchange for “withdrawing
any alternative possibility of [Trade Secret] protection for their invention . . . .”).
92. Gene Quinn, Why Do You Want a Patent?, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 8, 2014), www.ip
watchdog.com/2014/02/08/why-do-you-want-a-patent/id=45621.
93. Id.
94. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480–81.
95. See Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015),
www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485.
Depending on the complexity of the invention, acquiring a patent can cost anywhere from
$300–$800 in filing fees, $5,000–$20,000 in attorney’s fees for filing the patent. Id.
96. See Mathew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big
Pharma to Change, FORBES: PHARMA & HEALTHCARE (Aug. 11, 2013, 11:10 AM), www.forbes
.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-dr
ugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine (finding that current pharmaceutical research and
development trends are making it difficult and impractical to sustain growth in an industry
that relies on discovering successful drugs).
97. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (affirming the patentability
of a genetically modified bacteria that was designed by its inventor to break down crude
oil). In essence, patentable inventions include “anything under the sun that is made by man.”
Id. An invention must be manmade and cannot be an abstract idea, something that already
exists in the laws of nature, or a natural phenomenon. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981). For example, E = mc2, the formula created by Einstein, is unpatentable because it is
considered a law of nature. Id. at 309. A new earth mineral or a new plant discovered in
nature or mental processes or abstract intellectual processes are unpatentable because
holding a patent on a broad principle would encompass too much control on a subject
matter and halt scientific discoveries. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
98. 35 U.S.C § 101 (2000). In cohesion with the patentable subject matter requirement,
a patent must also be a “useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.”
ROBERT MERGES & PATRICK DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 209–54
(LexisNexis, 6th ed. 2013). Patent law requires an invention to be useful, by having some
benefit to society or have a practical application, to receive protection. Id. USPTO categorizes
useful inventions, like pharmaceutical drugs, into utility patent category. Amy L. Landers,
Understanding Patent Law § 7.01 (2d ed. 2012).
99. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (attributing the patent disclosure
obligation as part of the deal in securing exclusive rights on a patent). In exchange for the
limited monopoly, an inventor is required to disclose his invention. Id. To properly disclose
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(5) the invention must be nonobvious. 100 After the government grants a
patent, competitors or other indirect third party interests that do not
agree with USPTO’s decision can challenge a patent’s validity under
several proceedings, including IPR.101 Per the statute’s requirements, IPR
challenges can only be raised to invalidate a patent under the novelty 102
and nonobviousness103 tests.104

an invention, the inventor, as part of the specification requirement of a patent application,
is required to disclose (1) a written description of the invention, (2) enable a person of
ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the invention, (3) disclose the invention’s best
mode (best iteration/version), and (4) have definite claims of what the invention covers. 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Definite claims are covered in § 112(b). The claims must be definite to
inform the public of the protected features of the monopoly. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp.,
284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931); see generally Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972) (finding
“the chemical process or the physical acts which transformed the raw material are,
sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within rather definite bounds.”). Failure
to disclose the four requirements results in a rejected patent application or an invalid
patent. AMY L. LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW § 7.01 (2d ed. 2012).
100. See Merges supra note 98, at 605.
101. See Tran, supra note 90, at 626–36.
102. An invention must be new and never have existed before receiving a patent. MERGES
supra note 98, at 340. Novelty is defined by the critical date—also known as the date the
applicant created the invention. Id. The invention will be considered novel as long as there
is no reference that predates the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). A reference is considered
a piece of prior art that invalidates a patent. Id. Prior art is best described as a “piece of
knowledge” that was available in the public before the invention existed, and that a patent
examiner can legally use to determine if it can reject one or more of the claims in a patent
application. Id. Prior art can be an already existing patent or a printed publication like
information displayed on a power point presentation or information in a published book,
something that is already used or known by others. Id. For a reference to anticipate an
applicant’s invention, a single reference must “enable the invention, and disclose each and
every element of the invention” that is expressly or inherently described. Jason Brewer,
Comment, Updating the Patent System’s Novelty Requirement to Promote Small-Molecule
Medicinal Progress, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1151, 1157 (2012). Thus, novel inventions are
patentable because they promote and advance scientific discovery of inventions that do not
already exist in public. MERGES supra note 98, at 337–38.
103. LANDERS, supra note 99, at § 21.01. An invention must “represent more than an
obvious advance to the existing state of the art” to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
Id. The nonobviousness requirement is often referred to as the “final gatekeeper” in
determining if an invention is patentable or not. John Deere, 383 U.S. at 11. The nonobvious
requirement is justified for three reasons. First, to avoid inventions that do not require
much effort because they are an obvious next step in an industry. MERGES supra note 98, at
609. Second, granting obvious patents would undermine the incentives to develop
nonobvious inventions. Id. Finally, granting obvious patents would create a “proliferation of
economically insignificant patents that are expensive to search and to license.” Id. An
invention is unpatentable if the subject matter, in light of a combination of all pertinent prior
art, would be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(2000).
104. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2013). “A petitioner for an inter partes review may request to
cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised
under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed
publications.” Id.
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IPR, an Overview

After a patent is granted, USPTO has a continuing role in almost
everything concerning a patent.105 When the AIA was passed, three new
post-grant review (reexamination) procedures were added: post-grant
review (PGR), IPR, and covered business methods (CBM).106 IPR can be
used by anyone who is not the owner of a patent who wants to challenge
a patent’s validity.107 Strategically, IPR can be used by defendants in an
infringement action to attack patent’s validity, or by any outside third
party (likely a competitor) to attack the claims of the patent. 108 Thus,
competitors or outside third party interests—or anyone else with the
means to do so—can file an IPR.109 IPR was designed to be less expensive
and less time consuming than district court proceedings. 110 The creation
of IPR was motivated by the high cost of federal court litigation in the
patent industry and the fact the knowledge of these high costs were being
used, by larger companies, as a threat to force licenses or settlements on
smaller businesses who could not afford it.111 IPR was not only meant to
alleviate the financial burden that results from litigation, but also to
provide a specialized forum to resolve complex, scientific issues
associated with an invention.112 In an IPR proceeding, PTAB may correct,
modify or cancel single claims, many claims or all the claims of a patent. 113
IPR petitions can only be filed (1) nine months after a patent was
granted or immediately after a PGR proceeding concludes or is canceled,
whichever occurs later, and (2) after PTAB institutes an IPR petition,114
which includes a panel of three administrative judges that review the

105. LANDERS, supra note 99, at § 3.01. Post-patent grant, USPTO collects patent
maintenance fees, corrects and reissues patents, and resolves inventorship disputes. Id.
106. Scott A. McKeown, Is There Value in Ex Parte Reexamination After the AIA?, PATENTS
POST-GRANT (Feb. 14, 2013), www.patentspostgrant.com/is-there-value-in-ex-partepatent-reexamination-after-the-aia. After the AIA was passed, IPX was replaced by IPRs and
reports show that IPX petitions dropped 50% in one year from 2012–2013. Id. IPR replaced
IPX. Kenneth N. Nigon, Post Grant Review, Inter Partes Review and Transitional Program for
Covered
Business
Method
Patents,
IP
WATCHDOG
(Aug.
29,
2012),
www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/08/29/post-grant-review-inter-partes-review-andtransitional-program-for-covered-business-method-patents/id=27668.
107. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Matt Cutler, Inter Partes Review—Not Just an Anti-Troll Proceeding, LAW 360
(July 21, 2015, 9:52 AM), www.law360.com/articles/679716/inter-partes-review-not-justan-anti-troll-proceeding.
111. Michael Gulliford, If Patent Reform Is Meant to Starve Patent Trolls, Why Is It Feeding
Them Instead, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 8, 2015), www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/08/if-patentreform-is-meant-to-starve-patent-trolls-why-is-it-feeding-them-instead/id=51067.
112. Matal, supra note 86, at 601.
113. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–311 (2000).
114. The USPTO director must make a decision to institute an IPR petition three months
after an IPR is filed. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b). The director’s decision to institute an IPR is based on
the “reasonable likelihood” standard. Id. at § 316(a). The director’s scope is limited to
novelty and obviousness issues. Id.
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petitions and make a final written judgment on the merits. 115 IPR
proceedings are limited to questions about novelty and obviousness. 116
Also, all real parties of interest to the proceeding must be identified in an
IPR petition for fairness and to ensure that they “[have] not previously
filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent, and has
not been served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent
more than 1 year prior” to filing an IPR (exception for joinder). 117 For the
three-judge panel to review an IPR, the petitioner must show that there
“is a reasonably likelihood of success that the requester would prevail”
against at least one of the claims in the challenged patent. 118 An IPR
challenge would likely be granted if (1) an administrative judge finds, on
first glance, that the challenger submitted sufficient anticipatory or
obvious prior art evidence that would render the patent invalid and (2)
an administrative judge would reject a patent owner’s response to the
challenger’s prior art evidence.119 If an IPR petition is granted, PTAB will
fully review the patent and prior art evidence, and then issue a final
unappealable written decision about the patent’s validity.120 If the claims
are held invalid or valid, PTAB will issue a certificate of the canceled or
upheld claims.121
Finally, the federal courts have become more deferential to PTAB’s
rule-making authority and IPR decisions, a move that has empowered
PTAB and its application of IPR, giving PTAB a stronger solitary voice as
an agency.122 In fact, this authority was recognized in a recent U.S.
115. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 311(c).
116. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). There is a different obviousness test for pharmaceuticals and
other chemical compounds. Brewer, supra note 102, at 1158 (citing In re Hass, 141 F.2d 122,
125 (ruling that a homolog could not be patented unless it possessed some “unobvious or
unexpected beneficial properties not possessed by a homologous compound disclosed in
the prior art.”)). Pharmaceuticals and other types of chemical compounds that have similar
chemical structures “only supports a prima facie case of obviousness and shifts the burden
of proof to the [patent] applicant to show that the compound possesses unexpectedly
improved properties.” Brewer, supra note 102, at 1159 (citing In re Grabiak, 769 F.2d 729,
731 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see In Re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 390–92 (Fed. Cir. 1963) (holding that
the discovery of unexpected physical properties of a slightly changed homolog of an obvious
chemical compound is patentable because a person of ordinary skill in the art would not
have determined that the differences in structure resulted in different chemical properties).
Thus, trying to analyze obviousness of a chemical compound on structure alone would be
improper, because the properties of a compound cannot be predicted on the similarity of
structures alone. Kristen C. Buteau, Deuterated Drugs: Unexpectedly Nonobvious?, 10 J. HIGH
TECH L. 22, 38 (2009).
117. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). The patent owner cannot bring an IPR petition against its own
patent. Id.
118. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b).
119. See Allison J. Baldwin, Inter Partes Review and Inter Partes Reexamination: More
Than Just a Name Change, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (Feb. 2014), www.iptoday.com/issues/201
4/02/inter-partes-i-review-and-inter-partes-i-reexamination-more-than-just-namechange.asp.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 318(b).
122. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming the
rulemaking authority of USPTO and that a decision to institute an IPR is not judicially
reviewable by statute nor are PTAB final written decision on the matter). Using the broadest
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Supreme Court case, fortifying PTAB’s IPR decisions and authority in
patent law.123

C. Reverse Payment Agreements
and Product Hopping124
Two of the most common generic drug blocking/patent extending
methods are (1) reverse payment agreements 125 and (2) product
hopping.126 These methods appear to be in direct contradiction to the
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act: to facilitate the “efficient transition to
a market with low-cost, generic copies of those pioneering inventions . . .
.”127 Likewise, these methods contravene the purpose of patent law: a
benefit to the public through scientific progress and innovation. 128
A reverse payment agreement is when brand name pharmaceutical
company pays a rival generic drug company to abandon its challenge to
the brand name’s patent or to delay the release of its generic drug into the
market.129 This not only blocks a generic from entering the market, but
artificially extends a drug patent’s term.
In 2003, Congress attempted to address reverse payment
agreements with the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
reasonable interpretation standard is inherently unfavorable to patent owners because
more prior art can be brought in to invalidate a patent. A change of the standard would have
to be made in Congress. Ryan Davis, Fed. Cir. Signoff on PTAB Rules Boosts Patent Challengers,
LAW 360 (Feb. 4, 2015, 7:40 PM), www.law360.com/articles/618330/fed-circ-signoff-onptab-rules-boosts-patent-challengers. When it comes to IPR or PGR, specifically cases
involving novelty and obviousness, the Federal Circuit has upheld the majority of PTAB
decisions concerning the validity of challenged patents. Adam Floyd & Derrick Carman,
PTAB’s 3-Year Check-Up: How Rulings Hold Up at Fed. Cir., LAW 360 (Sept. 11, 2015, 4:01 PM),
www.law360.com/articles/699863/ptab-s-3-year-check-up-how-rulings-hold-up-at-fedcirc.
123. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016); Jennifer A. Mauri, A
Different Route: Challenging Orange Book Patents via Inter Partes Review, MICHELMAN &
ROBINSON LLP (July 18, 2016), www.mrllp.com/blog-a-different-route-challenging-orangebook-patents-via-inter-partes-review.
124. Although this comment presents both product hopping and reverse payment
agreements as methods that block generic drug market entry, this purpose is merely
informational. This comment’s focus is on reducing the negative effect of reverse payment
agreements.
125. These agreements are considered “reverse” because in contrast to patent licensing
agreements where the patent holder gets paid to let others use the patent, the patent holder
pays the generic brand not to compete. CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS, ANTITRUST 246–48 (2d ed.
2014).
126. Thomas, supra note 27, at 1.
127. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(citing Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)), rev’d on
other grounds, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3106 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2012).
128. See generally Time to Fix Patents, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2015), www.econom
ist.com/news/leaders/21660522-ideas-fuel-economy-todays-patent-systems-are-rottenway-rewarding-them-time-fix.
129. Edward Wyatt, Supreme Court Lets Regulators Sue Over Generic Drug Deals, N.Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/business/supreme-court-says-dru
g-makers-can-be-sued-over-pay-for-delay-deals.html?_r=0.
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Modernization Act (MMA).130 The MMA gave the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) the power to
review these agreements.131 But, the MMA did not impose antitrust
scrutiny on reverse payment agreements. 132 Thereafter, reverse payment
agreements became popular when the Eleventh Circuit, in ScheringPlough Corp v. FTC, rejected the notion that these agreements are
inherently suspect.133 After Schering-Plough, there were three reverse
payment agreements in 2005, fourteen in 2007, and then forty in 2012. 134
Eight years later, the Supreme Court took on reverse payment
agreements in FTC v. Actavis to determine whether these agreements “can
sometimes unreasonably diminish competition in violation of antitrust
laws.”135 In Actavis, two generic brands filed a paragraph IV challenge
against a brand name’s patent certifying that “listed patent was invalid
and their drugs did not infringe it.”136 Even though the brand name
initiated patent litigation against the generic brands to start the FDA
thirty-month stay, the litigation took longer, and the FDA approved the
first to file generic’s drug.137 However, in 2006, the brand name and the
first to file generic entered into a reverse payment agreement, which
terms stated that (1) the generic brand would not bring its generic
version of the drug to market until 2015, in other words, “65 months
before [the brand name’s] patent expired (unless someone else marketed
a generic sooner),” and (2) the brand name agreed to pay the first to file
generic “$19–$30 million annually, for nine years” as well as a one-time
payment of approximately $72 million to the other generic brand. 138
Although the parties attempted to explain that the payments were for
other services, the payments were used to “compensate the generics for
agreeing not to compete . . . .” 139 FTC filed an antitrust suit against the

130. Pub. Law No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
131. Id.
132. Thomas, supra note 27, at 8.
133. See generally, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC., 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005)
(finding that reverse payment agreement terms were within the scope of a patent’s
exclusionary rights and demonstrated a reasonable use of the protections afforded by the
law); Dennis Crouch, Economics: Explaining Reverse Payment in ANDA Litigation, PATENTLYO (Oct. 28, 2014), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/10/economics-explaining-litigation
.html (finding that there was a surge in reverse payment agreements after the 11th Circuit’s
Schering-Plough decision).
134. Trace Staton, FTC Stats Show Pharma Backing OFF Pay-for-Delay Deals After
SCOTUS Ruling, FIERCE PHARMA (Jan. 14, 2016), www.fiercepharma.com/legal/ftc-stats-showpharma-backing-off-pay-for-delay-deals-after-scotus-ruling.
135. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). For a more detailed discussion of
the Actavis case, patent law and antitrust law and their conflicting relationship, see Joel S.
Sprout, Note, Presumptively Illegal: The Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity in FTC v. Actavis,
Inc., 42 CAP. U.L. REV. 763, 770–80 (2014).
136. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
137. Id. The $72 million were divided between two generic brands who shared litigation
costs, Par Pharmaceutical and Paddock, in an arrangement through which Par received $60
million and Paddock received $12 million.
138. Actavis, 133 S .Ct. at 2229.
139. Id.
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brand name, but the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia dismissed the claims and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 140
This led to the Supreme Court holding that reverse payment
agreements may sometimes violate antitrust laws, and that “patent and
antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent
monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred
by a patent.”141 The Court reasoned that because the paragraph IV
challenge to the brand name’s patent put the patent’s validity at issue, and
because said litigation was halted before its resolution, the patent “may
or may not be valid, and may or may not be infringed.” 142 And while a
patent may give its owner the right to exclude others from using it, an
invalid patent does not.143 As such, because the settlement ended the
determination of the drug patent’s validity, the fear is that a patent that is
actually invalid is nevertheless keeping drug prices at “supracompetitive
levels,” resulting in brand names and generic brands winning, while
consumers lose.144 Overall, the Court pointed out that Hatch-Waxman’s
“procompetitive thrust” did not support anticompetitive reverse
payment agreements.145
Product hopping is when a pharmaceutical company comes out with
“new” version of an “old” drug and immediately ends the production of
the older, cheaper version.146 This forces consumers to purchase the new
version of the drug (e.g., going from capsule to tablet) at a higher price,
despite the new drug having the same therapeutic benefits as the old
drug.147 State drug distribution laws contribute to the effectiveness of
product hopping.148 Depending on the state, “pharmacists are either
permitted or required to dispense a therapeutically equivalent generic
drug in place of a brand-name drug unless the prescribing physician has
stipulated otherwise.”149 Essentially, when a brand name “product hops”
to the newly patented drug and withdraws the old unpatented drug from
the market, the generic version of the old unpatented drug that the
generic brand was in the process of developing no longer becomes
“therapeutically equivalent” under state law, and as a result, it “will not

140. Id.
141. Id. at 2227, 2231. Thus, reverse payment agreements should be reviewed under
the rule of reason analysis. Id. at 2237.
142. Id. at 2231.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2234–35.
145. Id. at 2234. For continued development on reverse payment agreements and
antitrust law, see King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388
(3d Cir. 2015).
146. Thomas, supra note 27, at 12.
147. Adam Kurtz, Product Hopping, Big Pharma and the High Cost of Prescription Drugs,
POMERANTZ MONITOR (Mar. 2015), http://pomerantzlawfirm.com/publications/2015/6/25/
product-hopping-big-pharma-and-the-high-cost-of-prescription-drugs.
148. Thomas, supra note 27, at 13.
149. Id. (“A generic drug must be designated as “AB”-rated within the Orange Book to
be deemed therapeutically equivalent to a brand-name drug.”). Id.
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be substituted for brand-name prescriptions.”150 This would delay
generic drug entry.
Since the Actavis decision, pay-for-delay settlements have decreased
to twenty-one in 2014.151 In 2015, FTC recorded the largest settlement of
$1.2 billion against Teva Pharmaceuticals because of its seven-year history
of spending over $300 million in settlements to block generic entry of its
sleep disorder drug.152 On March 16, 2016, FTC, for the first time, sued
ENDO Pharmaceuticals and several other drug companies, “over an
agreement not to compete through an authorized generic,” a pay-for-delay
settlement with an estimated worth $112 million.153 This FTC activity does
not mean that pay-for-delay settlements will be obsolete. ANDA filings have
increased from 234 in 2012 to 432 in 2014, leaving the potential for more
settlement opportunities.154 Essentially, drug companies will have to
maneuver under “reasonable and justified” language to legitimize their
settlements.155
In 2015, the Second Circuit, in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v.
Actavis PLC, determined whether antitrust laws applied to product
hopping.156 The Schneiderman case involved the product hopping of a
brand name’s Alzheimer’s drug, going from the old version (Namenda IR,
taken twice daily) to its newly patented version (Namenda XR, once-daily
extended release.157 Before the switch, Namenda IR generated about
“$1.5 billion in annual sales in 2012 and 2013.”158 When Namenda XR was
introduced, Namenda IR and Namenda XR became the only two specific
Alzheimer-type drugs of its kind, and represented 100% of the market.159
Namenda IR’s patent term was set to end in 2015, and Namenda XR’s
patent term does not end until 2029. 160 The Second Circuit justified
applying antitrust law to product hopping patented drugs citing the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Actavis.161 In finding that antitrust laws
could be violated because product hopping can be anti-competitive and
exclusionary, the Second Circuit stated that the brand name’s actions in
Schneiderman were a violation of antitrust laws because:
150. Id.
151. Staton, supra note 134.
152. Rebecca R. Ruiz & Katie Thomas, Teva Settles Cephalon Generics Case with FTC for
$1.2 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/05/29/business/tevacephalon-provigil-ftc-settlement.html?_r=1.
153. Jeff Zalesin, FTC Sues Endo, Generics for Pay-For-Delay Agreements, LAW 360 (Mar.
31, 2016), www.law360.com/ip/articles/778572.
154. BRIAN C. HOWARD, LEX MACHINA, PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW 18 (2014), https:/
/pages.lexmachina.com/rs/lexmachina/images/2014%20Patent%20Litiga
tion%20Report.pdf.
155. Michael A. Carrier, Actavis and “Large and Unjustified” Payments, SCOTUS BLOG (July
25, 2013, 4:09 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2013/07/actavis-and-large-and-unjustified-pay
ments.
156. New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 2015).
157. Id. at 646–47.
158. Id. at 647.
159. Id. at 651–52.
160. Id. at 647.
161. Id. at 659–60.
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[The] hard switch—the combination of introducing Namenda XR into the
market and effectively withdrawing Namenda IR—forced Alzheimer’s
patients who depend on memantine therapy to switch to XR (to which
generic IR is not therapeutically equivalent) and would likely impede
generic competition by precluding generic substitution through state drug
substitution laws. . . . [W]ithout a legitimate business justification, [this]
violates § 2 of the Sherman Act.162

Ultimately, like reverse payment agreements in Actavis, the Second
Circuit held that product hopping could violate antitrust laws and thus
should be analyzed under the rule of reason.

D. Reviewing Kyle Bass’s “Short Activist Strategy”
and His War on Drug Patents
Kyle Bass has always been forthcoming about his intentions using
IPR: he wants to make money and to make drugs more affordable by
invalidating weak patents.163 Bass alleges drug companies obtained these
weak patents by abusing the system through statutory loopholes, like the
use of reverse payment agreements and product hopping, stating that “[a]
small minority of drug companies are abusing the patent system to
sustain invalid patents that contain no meaningful innovations but serve
to maintain their own anti-competitive, high-price monopoly, harming
Americans suffering from illnesses.” 164 Using methods like reverse
payment agreements or product hopping, the drug industry has been
accused of “taking advantage of a mix of laws” and “exploiting these fault
lines.”165
162. Id. at 654.
163. See generally Balazs Koranyi U.S. Hedge Fund Plans to Take On Big Pharma over
Patents, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2015), www.reuters.com/article/pharmaceuticals-haymancapitalidUSL3N0UM42O20150107.
164. Julia La Roche, Kyle Bass Scored a Huge Win in His Big Short Strategy, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2015, 4:35 PM), www.businessinsider.com/no-sanctions-for-kyle-bassipr-2015-9. Kyle Bass calls Horizon Pharma’s (Horizon Pharma PLC) arthritis drug, Vimovo,
a “ridiculous” and anti-Patent-Act type of drug that IPRs were meant to invalidate, because
the drug, according to Bass, combines two cheap over the counter drugs (Nexium and Aleve)
in an obvious way. Ryan Davis, Hedge Fund Hits “Ridiculous” Horizon Patent with AIA Review,
LAW 360 (May 22, 2015, 5:40 PM), www.law360.com/articles/659301/hedge-fund-hitsridiculous-horizon-patent-with-aia-review. CFAD attacks Pharmacyclics’s leukemia drug,
claiming a published research paper anticipates the drug and thus the information is already
in the public domain. Ryan Davis, Hedge Fund’s Latest Patent Attack Targets Pharmacyclics,
LAW 360 (Apr. 21, 2015, 9:07 PM), www.law360.com/articles/645849/hedge-fund-s-latestpatent-attack-targets-pharmacyclics.
165. See generally Peter B. Bach, Why Drugs Cost So Much, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015),
www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/opinion/why-drugs-cost-so-much.html?_r=0
(“Frivolous patent—like a method of exercising a cat and a crustless peanut butter and jelly
sandwich—have riveted the public’s attention.”); see MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 200 (2009). The blame for abuses in the patent industry has been placed on
the executive branch and the judicial branch of the federal government for two reasons: (1)
the USTPO’s lack of resources to comprehensively examine approximately four thousand
patents issued each week and (2) the Federal Circuit’s creation of formulistic rules on issues
of obviousness, experimental use, and injunctive relief among other rules that have made
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As aforementioned, IPR can be used by anyone with the means to do
so. This includes hedge funds. Even though Kyle Bass and his hedge fund
subsidiary, CFAD, are not the first group to use IPRs for financial gain, 166
Kyle Bass and CFAD are the first to publicly admit that they are using the
“short activist strategy” which has angered the drug industry. 167
Kyle Bass’s proclaimed “short activist strategy” is simply betting
that a pharmaceutical company’s stock will fall and that his hedge fund
will profit from that fall because of one of two outcomes that go against
the challenged drug company: (1) an IPR challenge against that
company’s patented drug is made public or (2) a patent challenged by an
IPR is instituted and invalidates that patent. 168 There is speculation that
Kyle Bass will not go after every pharmaceutical patent because he stands
to profit by investing in the direct competitors of the pharmaceutical
companies against which he has filed IPRs. 169 This “short activist
strategy” can be explained in a simple analogy.
For example, Kyle and Sam are neighbors. Sam recently bought a
printer for $200. One day, Kyle asks Sam if he can borrow Sam’s printer
to print an important assignment for work. Sam agrees, and hands the
printer to Kyle to take home and use. While Kyle waits for his documents
to be printed, Kyle reads a magazine ad and also sees a TV commercial
from an electronics store. Both advertisements for the business say that
new merchandise is coming in its store and for one day it will pay
customers back the difference in any recently purchased product that has
dropped in price. Realizing that Sam recently purchased the printer from
litigation complicated and rigid. Id.
166. Michelle Carniaux and Michael E. Sander, The Curious Case of New Bay Capital LLC
and VirnetX Inc., IPR BLOG (Nov. 22, 2015, 5:15 PM), https://interpartesreviewblog.com/
curious-case-new-bay-capital-llc-virnetx-inc. New Bay Capital LLC was rumored to have
taken the short against a publicly traded patent licensing entity, VirnetX Holding
Corporation, after New Bay had filed IPRs against VirnetX. Id. The rumor was never
substantiated because short selling is privately conducted. Id.
167. Beth Winegarner, Celgene Calls Kyle Bass’ AIA Review Bids “Harassment,” LAW 360
(Sept. 11, 2015), www.law360.com/articles/701833/celgene-calls-kyle-bass-aia-reviewbids-harassment-. Celgene Corp. claims CFAD’s has no interest in invalidating patents and
that CFAD’s IPR bids constitute “harassment” for profits. Id. Wall Street hedge funds have
“exploited” the IPR process against congressional intent. Lisa Shuchman, Big Pharma: Let’s
Shift Patent Debate Away From Trolls, CORP. COUNS. (May 20, 2015), www.corpcounsel.com/
id=1202726911929/Big-Pharma-Lets-Shift-Patent-Debate-Away-From-Trolls#ixzz3lSTC
WgDD (discussing the concern of IPR abuse in the pharmaceutical industry). MCM Portfolio
LLC, the owner of a now invalid patent, argued in federal court that USPTO’s IPR
proceedings are unconstitutional because patents are property rights that should be
adjudicated in court and not in administrative agencies. Jimmy Hoover, Patent Owner Calls
IPR Process Unconstitutional at Fed. Cir., LAW 360 (Sept. 11, 2015, 4:06 PM), www.law3
60.com/articles/701764/patent-owner-calls-ipr-process-unconstitutional-at-fed-circ-.
168. Gene Quinn, Patent Abuse or Genius? Is Kyle Bass Abusing the Patent System?, IP
WATCHDOG (Apr. 8, 2015), www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/08/is-kyle-bass-abusing-the-pa
tent-system/id=56613; Dr. Kristel Schorr, Dr. Jason N. Mock & Lydia B. Choi, The Road Ahead
for Kyle Bass’s IPRs, LAW 360 (Aug. 28, 2015, 5:39 PM), www.law360.com/articles/696911/
the-road-ahead-for-kyle-bass-s-iprs. Christopher R. Walker, Article, Deadly Delay/
Postponed Pills, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 253, 255–56 (2010).
169. Quinn, supra note 168. This may be why Kyle Bass is not be targeting every single
Orange Book–listed patent for a given drug or even drug patents that are almost ending. Id.
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that store, Kyle does his research and finds the printer on the electronics
store’s website. Kyle sees that the printer’s price had dropped $100.
Unbeknownst to Sam, Kyle takes the printer to the electronics store as
proof of purchase and receives $100 in cash for the difference between
the original price and the price decrease. Without Sam noticing, John
pockets the $100 in cash.170 Although it is a simplified example, this
“shorting the stock” strategy is completely legal and regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.171
This is Kyle Bass’s “short activist strategy” in effect. But instead of
taking back a reduced price printer, Bass anonymously borrows
pharmaceutical stocks from a broker, and profits off of the difference
when a drug company’s stock price plummets because of the institution
of an IPR against a drug patent or when an IPR invalidates a drug
patent.172 However, shorting the stock is risky and can prove costly. 173
Using our printer price example, let us say the price goes up $10, then a
trader would have to buy back at $210 (for a loss) to replace what he
borrowed when the broker demands that the trader return the borrowed
stocks.174 A lot of research and care must go into this strategy.
This financial strategy against drug companies could prove highly
lucrative if Kyle Bass were to successfully invalidate a drug company’s
patent. For example, Kyle Bass’s IPR challenge filed against a Jazz
Pharmaceuticals’ cancer drug Imbruvica threatens to invalidate a
patented drug that makes up two-thirds of Jazz’s $800 million total
revenue.175 So far, Kyle Bass and CFAD have launched over thirty IPRs
against more than fifteen publicly traded pharmaceutical companies.176

170. Brigitte Yuille, Short Selling Tutorial, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/univ
ersity/shortselling/ (last updated Apr. 28, 2017, 1:34 PM). Shorting a stock is when an
investor or trader, based on market predictions that a stock will decline, borrows, for
example, one hundred shares for $50 a share from a willing broker. Id. The trader then will
close the short position and buy one hundred shares back to replace the borrowed shares
when the stocks drop to $45 a share, as predicted, and then pockets $500 for the difference.
Id.
171. 17 C.F.R. § 201. After the market crash and the Great Depression of the 1920s and
1930s, Congress investigated and researched short selling as a potential problem but
ultimately declined to perform any action making it illegal. When Congress passed the
Securities and Exchange Act in 1934, Congress gave the Securities and Exchange
Commission broad powers to regulate short selling to prevent abuse of the stock market.
Adam Hayes, Why Is Short Selling Legal? A Brief History, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 6, 2014), www.i
nvestopedia.com/articles/investing/110614/why-short-selling-legal-brief-history.asp.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Rich Steeves, Hedge Fund, IPR Rocking the Pharma Patent Space, INSIDE COUNS. (May
12, 2015), www.insidecounsel.com/2015/05/12/hedge-funds-ipr-rocking-the-pharma-pa
tent-space. Jazz Pharmaceuticals can breathe easy as PTAB has denied instituting Kyle
Bass’s IPR challenge against its cancer drug Imbruvica. Kelly Knaub, PTAB Denies Another
Kyle Bass Petition for Drug Review, LAW 360 (Oct. 20, 2015, 4:41 PM), www.law360.com
/articles/716375/ptab-denies-another-kyle-bass-petition-for-drug-review.
176. Julia La Roche, Kyle Bass Scored a Huge Win in His Big Short Strategy, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2015, 4:35 PM), www.businessinsider.com/no-sanctions-for-kyle-bassipr-2015-9.
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E. The Drug Industry’s Response to
Kyle Bass and Their Request for IPR Exemption
1.

The Difficulty in Making a New Drug, Big Pharma’s Reasons for High
Drug Prices

Generally, a “pioneering drug” is deserving of a patent because of the
amount of time and money spent researching it and testing it during
clinical trials.177 Patents are important to brand name pharmaceutical
companies because “the pharmaceutical industry is an innovationdependent industry, and so the intellectual property rights, specifically
patents, are much more important in this industry than in others.” 178 On
average, patented drugs make up 70% of total drug sale revenues for Big
Pharma.179 A drug’s price decreases almost 90% once its patent term ends
or it is invalidated under the Hatch-Waxman Act.180 In 2011 and 2012,
when sixteen major patents expired, this resulted in $12 billion and $30
billion in lost revenue, respectively.181
Research and development is “likely the most vital part of big
pharma.”182 The cost of developing a new drug can range from $800
million to $5 billion.183 But spending this money does not always
guarantee success: “95% of the experimental medicines that are studied
in humans fail to be both effective and safe” and thus never pass the FDA’s
regulations.184 Obtaining FDA approval to market a new drug is a long and
difficult process. Big Pharma claims this is the reason why acquiring a
patent, maintaining a patent, and having high drugs prices are
acceptable.185
177. See supra Part II.A; ECONOMIST, supra note 128.
178. Mike Benson, Patents Mean Big Business to Big Pharma, MARKET REALIST (Feb. 20,
2015, 12:29 PM), https://marketrealist.com/2015/02/patents-big-pharma.
179. Id.
180. Natalie Stoltz, Comment, Reverse Payment Agreements: Why a “Quick Look” Properly
Protects Patents and Patients, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1189, 1190 (2014).
181. Benson, supra note 178. Patents that are soon expiring are estimated to cause even
higher losses of revenue in 2014 ($34 billion) and 2015 ($66 billion). Id.
182. Mike Benson, Big Pharma Invests Big Money in Research and Development, MARKET
REALIST (Feb. 20, 2015, 12:29 PM), https://marketrealist.com/2015/02/patents-big-pharm
a. “A single drug to market can expect to have spent $350 million before the medicine is
available for sale. In part because so many drugs fail, large pharmaceutical companies that
are working on dozens of drug projects at once spend $5 billion per new medicine.” See
Herper, supra note 96.
183. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 3. Any use or production of a patented product for
experimental, noncommercial uses was permitted and not considered patent infringement.
Id. There is a statutory research exemption for research and development of drugs and
medical devices. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2012); see, e.g., Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (ruling that the experimental use defense is limited to acts taken for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or strictly for philosophical inquiry and not applicable
for the purpose to further an infringer’s legitimate business interests).
184. Herper, supra note 96.
185. With cancer medicine ranging from $13,000 to $64,000 a month for a prescription,
drug companies blame the costly and lengthy research and development process, while
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The Drug Industry’s Plea to PTAB to Stop Kyle Bass

Frustrated by Kyle Bass and his “short activist strategy,” one drug
company eventually asked PTAB to reject Kyle Bass’s use of IPR. After
having four of its drug patents challenged by Kyle Bass through CFAD,
Calgene asked PTAB to sanction CFAD for what Calgene alleges is an
abuse of the IPR proceedings.186 In response, PTAB requested
memoranda from Calgene and CFAD as to why the “short activist
strategy” is or is not an abuse of the IPR proceedings, and whether this
type of “strategy” is sanctionable.187 Three months later, PTAB responded
by denying Celgene’s motion for the following reasons:
Profit is at the heart of nearly every patent and nearly every inter partes
review. As such, an economic motive for challenging a patent claim does not
itself raise abuse of process issues. We take no position on the merits of
short-selling as an investment strategy other than it is legal, and regulated
. . . . Accordingly, consistent with the proposition that Article III standing is
not a requirement to appear before this administrative agency, we hold that
Congress did not limit inter partes reviews to parties having a specific
competitive interest in the technology covered by the patents.188

Frankly speaking, this means that it is open season on the drug
industry.189 PTAB will not aid the drug patent industry to prevent IPR use
in any “shorting” strategies, nor will it help Big Pharma by making any
Article III standing rules to narrow third party standing.190 From now on,
all of Kyle Bass’s IPR filings will be reviewed on the merits. The
pharmaceutical industry is now left with two choices: ask Congress to
either pass patent reform, or be granted exemption from IPR
proceedings.
other claim that drug companies are “taking advantage of a mix of laws that force insurers
to include essentially all expensive drugs in their policies,” as well buying rights to old and
inexpensive drugs and shut out other competitors. Peter B. Bach, Why Drugs Cost So Much,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/opinion/why-drugs-cost-so-m
uch.html?_r=0.
186. Lisa Schuchman, PTAB Allows Challenge to Inventor’s Patent Strategy, CORP. COUNS.
(June 22, 2015), www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202730002109/PTAB-Allows-Challenge-toInvestors-Patent-Strategy.
187. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d).
188. Coalition For Affordable Drugs VI, LLC, v. Celgene Corporation, No. 571.272.7822,
Paper 19 at 3–4 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015); see Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (stating that an administrative agency is not subject to Article III of the
Constitution of the United States, so a petitioner would have no need to establish standing
to participate in proceedings before the agency); see also Consumer Watchdog v. Wis.
Alumni Res. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Sierra Club).
189. Ryan Davis, Bass ‘Patent Troll’ Ally Seeks Help Targeting Depomed IP, LAW 360 (Sept.
29, 2014, 10:17 PM), www.law360.com/articles/708511/bass-patent-troll-ally-seeks-help
-targeting-depomed-ip. In response to the USTPO sanction ruling, Erich Spangenberg
praised USPTO’s decision and called upon every member of the public, willing and able, to
file IPRs against the pharmaceutical industry. Id.
190. See Gene Quinn, BIO, PhRMA Lobby for IPR Fix to Insulate Their Patents from
Challenge, IP WATCHDOG (July 25, 2015), www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/26/bio-phrmalobby-for-ipr-fix/id=59965.
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A Request for IPR Exemption

Finally, Big Pharma requested that Congress exempt its drug patents
from AIA post-grant reviews.191 Big Pharma argues that because its drug
patents are subject to invalidity challenges through Hatch-Waxman
litigation,192 its patents should not have to be subject to AIA review, which
drug makers claim “usurps” the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 193
Most importantly, IPR ignores a patent’s presumption of validity and the
clear and convincing evidence standard needed to rebut that
presumption.194 One argument is that methods like reverse payments
agreements offset the financial risk of producing a new drug, thereby
allowing brand name companies to secure profits to recoup NDA and
patent expenditures and funnel those profits into continued research and
development, which results in the continued creation of new and
innovative drugs.195
As abovementioned, getting a patent for an FDA NDA is an important
business model, and now after the recent Actavis and Schneiderman
decisions, drug patents are not only just subject to IPR and HatchWaxman patent invalidating procedures—they are subject to antitrust
scrutiny. The argument is that this increased scrutiny against drug
patents will scare potential investors and future settlement talks, which
will lead to less innovation and drugs on the market. 196

III. ANALYSIS
Recently, PTAB has instituted CFAD’s challenge against Cosmos
Technologies’ patent, the first among CFAD’s IPR challenges against the
pharmaceutical industry.197 Cosmos Technologies’ patent, a drug called

191. Ryan Davis, Drugmakers Have Tough Task in Quest for AIA Exemption,
PHARMACEUTICAL (Sept. 11, 2015, 4:28 PM), www.law360.com/articles/700894/drugma
kers-have-tough-task-in-quest-for-aia-exemption.
192. See Quinn, supra note 16.
193. See Bultman, supra note 19. The Hatch-Waxman provides generic drug companies
the ability to compete with brand name drugs by allowing it to bypass having to file a
complete new drug application and conduct clinical studies of their drug with the FDA.
Construction and Application of Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 and 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e) (1994)), 180 A.L.R.
Fed. 487, 2a. Generic drug companies only need to complete an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA), which use a brand name drug company’s NDA clinical trial information
and labeling information. Id.
194. T. Chet Compton, Comment, Redrawing the Line Between Patent Rights and
Antitrust Law: How the U.S. Supreme Court’s Over-Extension of Antitrust Law Harms Patent
Holders, Damages Innovation, and Discourages Settlements, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 365, 389–90
(2014).
195. Id. at 393–95.
196. Id. at 399–401.
197. Lisa Shuchman, Kyle Bass Wins One as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Agrees to
Review a Drug Patent, CORP. COUNS. (Oct. 8, 2015), www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202739363
823/Kyle-Bass-Wins-One-as-the-Patent-Trial-and-Appeal-Board-Agrees-to-Review-Drug-
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Lialda, is used to combat ulcerative colitis. 198 Prior to the IPR challenge,
Actavis PLC certified a paragraph IV challenge against Lialda under the
Hatch-Waxman Act to introduce a generic version of Lialda to the
market.199 This is a good example of a drug company having to fight
invalidity challenges on two fronts, and there is a prevailing fear that this
dual attack will deter investors because there the higher risk is not worth
the reward.200 Moreover, more questions arise concerning whether IPR
has an effect on certain Hatch-Waxman provisions because of the
different invalidating standards at PTAB and the federal court, and the
fact that Hatch-Waxman precedes the AIA and it may not be interpreted
to allow IPR decisions to “trigger” Hatch-Waxman provisions.201
Big Pharma is pushing for legislation that would exempt it from
being challenged by IPR altogether. 202 But after taking a closer look of
how IPR is affecting the bio/pharma patents, including Kyle Bass’s
challenges, the drug industry will see that their request for exemption is
unsupported.
Part III consists of three sections. The first section compares the
pros and the cons of both IPR and Hatch-Waxman litigation and reviews
IPR’s effect on patents and in particular to bio/pharma patents. This will

Patent?slreturn=20150913145749.
198. The drug is licensed to Shire Pharmaceuticals PLC. Tracy Staton, Shire’s Lialda,
Gattex are Hedge Funder’s Latest Patent Targets, FIERCE PHARMA (Apr. 6, 2015), www.fierc
epharma.com/story/shires-lialda-gattex-are-hedge-funders-latest-patent-targets/201504-06. Lialda, Shire’s second best-selling drug, makes up 10% of Shire’s revenue and earned
it $633 million in sales in 2014. Id.
199. Tracy Staton, Shire’s Bid to Block Lialda Copies Hits Another Snag, FIERCE PHARMA
(June 4, 2015), www.fiercepharma.com/story/shires-bid-block-lialda-copies-hits-anothersnag/2015-06-04. In Shire’s case against Actavis, the Federal Court of Appeals narrowed the
scope of the Lialda patent through interpretation of its claims. Id. This paved the way for
generic version of Lialda to enter the market. Id. Shire filed an appeal, and the case was
remanded from the Supreme Court in response to the Supreme Court decision in Teva v.
Sandoz. Id. In response, the Federal Court of Appeals still found Shire’s patent rights were
narrower than the District Court had determined, and remanded the case back to trial to
apply the standard. Id. Kyle Bass and CFAD have also challenged the patent validity of Gattex,
Shire’s short bowel treatment drug, which Shire acquired in February 2015 for $5.2 billion.
Id. The Gattex patent expires in 2022. Id.; Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
831, 841 (2015) (ruling that on appeal, a court must give deference to the trial courts factual
findings unless the trial court has committed clear error).
200. See Lisa Schuchman, Big Patent Problems for Big Pharma and Biotech, CORP. COUNS.
(Aug. 4, 2015), www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202733863100/Big-Patent-Problems-for-BigPharma-and-Biotech?slreturn=20150917121834 (Big Pharma fears that the way IPR is
used by groups like CFAD, will “discourage future investments in new medicines,” while
others allege the pharmaceutical industry is simply trying to insulate and protect itself
excessively).
201. See Brian T. Apel, Note, An Administrative Meter Maid: Using Inter Partes Review
and Post-Grant Review to Curb Exclusivity Parking via the “Failure to Market” Provision of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 114 MICH. L. REV. 107 (2015) (arguing and amendment should be made
to the Hatch-Waxman Act that would allow IPR decisions to “trigger” the forfeiture
provision of the Act to curb “exclusivity parking.”); see also Jaiman Shah, Article, Pulling the
‘Trigger’ on the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 180-Exclusivity Using Inter Partes Review, 14 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 453 (2015).
202. See Bultman, supra note 19.
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determine whether IPR is a better generic drug delivery system than
Hatch-Waxman and if PTAB’s patent “death squad” moniker means bad
news bio/pharma patents. Finally, a review of IPR recent decisions on
some of CFAD’s IPR challenges will show that the drug patent industry is
seeking the wrong type of legislation in IPR exemption. In fact, after
taking a look at a comparison of IPR and ANDA litigation side by side, the
drug industry should consider updating the Hatch-Waxman Act.

A. Hatch-Waxman versus IPR
Generally, both ANDA and IPR have a purpose of challenging a
patent’s validity. Also, the noninfringement 203 benefit generic drug
companies receive for conducting drug patents experiments, as long as
these experiments in using a patented drug are reasonably related to the
development and FDA approval of their generic drug, applies whether a
generic decides to file an ANDA or an IPR. 204
That is where its similarities end and their differences begin with
these two procedures. There are several different substantive and policy
differences that distinguish Hatch-Waxman litigation from IPR. The
following section demonstrates how both IPR and ANDA litigation have
advantages and disadvantages.
1.

ANDA Litigation and IPR: Filings and Court Differences

Procedurally, whether you are a generic brand that filed an ANDAcertified paragraph IV challenge or a generic that files an ANDA
certification and a separate IPR challenge, all ANDA applications require
(1) bioequivalence data,205 (2) certification, and (3) notice to the patent
owner of the patented drug that the generic drug company has filed an
ANDA for a generic version of the patented drug. 206 In comparison,
whether you are a generic brand or a third party that files an IPR, the IPR
petition has to be made by a person or entity who is not the owner of a
patent,207 and must contain (1) a pleading of patent invalidity only on a
ground of anticipation or obviousness or both and only on the basis of

203. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e). This statutory exception, also known as the “FDA Safe Harbor,”
can be applied broadly and thus a patent holder cannot sue others for using the patent for
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under
a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
products.” Id. A patent holder can sue others for patent infringement if the non-patent
holders make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import the patented invention into the U.S. without
the patent holder’s permission. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (holding that the scope of § 271(e) is broad and can apply to
scientific research on a drug that is intended to be submitted to the FDA and scientific
research on patented compounds that are not submitted to the FDA).
204. Id.
205. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
206. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 10–24.
207. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a).
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prior art consisting of patents or printed publications,208 (2) an
identification of all real parties in interest,209 and (3) an identification, in
detail, of each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to
each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the challenges to each
claim.210 In contrast, any person or entity that wants to file an IPR does
not have to supply any kind of bioequivalence data or comply with an
ANDA or NDA to file an IPR.211
IPR is a “mini-trial” administrative proceeding that is meant to be
less expensive and a less time-consuming alternative to federal court
litigation.212 ANDA litigation, in contrast, is adjudicated in federal court
and is directly tailored for generic drug companies to quickly introduce
their generic drugs to the marketplace.213
ANDA litigation mirrors traditional patent infringement cases in
federal court where there is a pleading, forum selection, case
scheduling,214 discovery,215 claim construction,216 a trial, and appeal.217
Similar to IPR cases, ANDA cases are litigated without a jury, but unlike
an IPR proceeding where there is a panel of three administrative judges,
a single Article III judge reviews the ANDA case. 218 Also, while IPR final
written decisions are unappealable to PTAB, 219 ANDA decisions are
appealable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.220 While a patent
infringement trial lasts one to two weeks, on average ANDA litigation
cases can last twenty-seven months.221 Damages are generally not
available since the NDA/patent holder is asking for equitable relief in the
208. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
209. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2).
210. 37 C.F.R. § 43.104.
211. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
212. See Cutler, supra note 110; see also Baldwin, supra note 119 (creating IPR set a
“mini-trial” proceedings that takes less time to adjudicate and costs less than a trial in the
federal court system).
213. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 17. The policy goal was to quickly introduce generic
drugs to the market to drive down drug costs. Id. at 5.
214. Id. at 77–80. Case scheduling occurs early within the thirty-month stay. Id.
215. Id. at 80. Some jurisdictions have adopted specific ANDA related procedural rule,
which relate to timing and discovery orders. Id. at 81. The District Court of New Jersey is
known to have the most comprehensive pretrial rules. Id. The District Court of New Jersey
and the District Court of Delaware are the courts where the most ANDA cases are litigated.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE HEADLINES, WHILE
PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE (2013), www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/ass
ets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
216. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 81.
217. Id. at 75–88.
218. Id. at 86–87.
219. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 77–80. Case scheduling occurs early within the thirtymonth stay. Id.
220. Id. at 87. An appeal can delay the 180-day exclusivity if the trial court finds that a
patent is valid or infringed. Id. In this scenario, the 180-day market exclusivity would occur
if the Federal Court of Appeals reverses and finds a patent is valid or noninfringement. Id. at
88.
221. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A CLOSER LOOK: 2008 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: DAMAGES
AWARDS, SUCCESS RATES, AND TIME-TO-TRIAL (2008), www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services
/assets/2008_patent_litigation_study.pdf.
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form of a permanent injunction.222 In contrast, IPR challenges are simply
a forum for patent invalidation.
2.

ANDA versus IPR: Cost and Time to Litigate

The lifespan of an IPR challenge from petition institution to possible
invalidation by a final written decision by PTAB usually takes twelve
months to complete, up to a maximum of eighteen months.223 Including
attorney’s fees, an IPR can cost anywhere from $300,000 to $1 million
depending on the firm.224 This beats the time it complete an ANDA case,
which on average, including attorney’s fees, can cost up to $10 million and
take up to twenty-seven months to complete.225
When a generic drug company files an ANDA paragraph IV
certification, subsequently notifies the brand name of that challenge, 226
and the brand name appropriately responds, the brand name has the
benefit of the FDA staying approval of the ANDA application for thirty
months, pending litigation227 or other events.228 On average the FDA takes
eighteen to twenty-four months to approve an ANDA application. 229
ANDA applicants and drug patent holders prefer that any litigation issues
be resolved and concluded within the thirty-month stay to forgo any
additional complicated matters.230 An IPR challenge does not trigger a
thirty-month stay.231

222. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 241. Compensatory damages are not awarded because
the generic company usually refrains from making, using, or selling the generic drug
commercially until ANDA litigation ends. Id. Several forms of injunctive relief are available.
See id. at 245–71.
223. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) (2015).
224. Quinn G., supra note 190.
225. Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic
Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1788, 1795 n.41 (2011).
226. MMA. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
227. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 14. The FDA requires strict compliance with the fortyfive-day period because if the NDA/patent holder does not respond the FDA may approve
the ANDA immediately despite any actual patent or exclusivity issues. Id. If the NDA/patent
owner sues, then the FDA will delay the ANDA approval for thirty months. Id.
228. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
229. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 15.
230. Id. at 77. NDA/patent holders prefer to delay generic entry as long as possible so if
they have a weak patent, they would prefer that litigation end as close to the end of the
thirty-month stay, to keep the current market price on the branded drug as long as possible.
Id. at 87. If the NDA/patent holder has a strong claim, then it would seek a trial in hope of
winning and being granted an injunction against the introduction of the generic drug into
the market place. Generic companies prefer the opposite because the end of litigation in
their favor would activate one of the three scenarios terminating the thirty-month stay and
allowing them to introduce their drug to the market as soon as possible. Id. Litigating past
the thirty-month stay introduces complicated decisions such as NDA/patent holders filing
injunctions, or generic companies taking the risk to market the drug with the possibility of
facing an injunction. Id.
231. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.105 (2015).
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The Exclusivity Benefit, Patent Infringement, and Article III Standing

Under the Hatch-Waxman framework,232 paragraph IV certification
“authorizes and streamlines” a generic drug’s market entry by allowing
the generic drug to rely on the brand name drug’s NDA safety and efficacy
data.233 The generic who is the first to file and successfully challenges the
brand name’s patent receives the 180-day market exclusivity right
against all other generic drug companies.234 This is the most significant
difference between ANDA and IPR. The 180-day market exclusivity is
supposed to be the most important incentive for generic companies to
challenge a patented drug under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Another big difference between ANDA and IPR is the Article III
standing requirement.235 Under a paragraph IV challenge, a generic
notifies the FDA and the brand name company that it is challenging the
brand name’s patented drug, and asserting that it is not committing
patent infringement or that the patent is invalid.236 This assertion is
unique to Hatch-Waxman because of the need for an “artificial” act of
patent infringement.237 The “artificial infringement” provides the patent
holder with the Article III “case or controversy” standing needed to sue in
federal court.238 Essentially a generic drug company “risks” being
subjected to a permanent injunction if the patent is deemed valid and
infringed, having to wait until the drug patent’s term ends before it can
market its generic product.239 Conversely, if the generic were to not
infringe or invalidate the patent, as the first filer it gains the 180 days of
market exclusivity.240 Because of this high risk and high reward challenge,

232. Supra Part II.A.2.
233. 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b–68c, 70b; 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 355(j), 360cc; 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and 25
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282.
234. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 22.
235. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
236. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii)(I)–(IV) (2002); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12).
Generic companies who file under paragraphs I, II, and III do not trigger any patent
infringement repercussions because they do not challenge any patent rights. DORSNEY, supra
note 42, at 30 n.51.
237. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
238. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 10. The “safe harbor” provision of the Hatch-Waxman
Act prevents a patent owner from suing generic drug manufacturers for using the patent in
their clinical experiments and studies. Id. Justiciability issues would occur if the patent
owner sued the generic company because they would not have standing in federal court. Id.
The Hatch-Waxman Act makes the filing of an ANDA an act of infringement and gives the
patent owner standing to resolve their issues in federal court. Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm.
Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
239. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 207 (compensatory damages are not awarded because
the generic company usually refrains from making, using, or selling the generic drug
commercially until ANDA litigation ends).
240. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 22. The first generic company to file a paragraph IV
certification has a 180-day market exclusivity against all other generic companies that filed
later ANDAs. Id. Even more beneficial, is that the first to file a paragraph IV certification is
entitled to the 180-day market exclusivity regardless if the ANDA applicant wins or loses its
litigation case against the NDA/patent holder. See, e.g., Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v.
Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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a generic drug company usually attacks drug patents it thinks are weak
and vulnerable to a challenge.241
In contrast, under IPR, there is no Article III standing requirement
“which means that anyone can bring an IPR for any reason.”242 But while
a generic drug company may avoid an injunction under IPR, it may forgo
the 180-day market exclusivity to another generic drug company that is
the first to file a paragraph IV litigation.243 As above mentioned, there are
many questions regarding what would happen to the 180-day exclusivity
right if a paragraph IV first to file generic were to successfully file an
IPR.244 However, it is important for generic brands to remember that, by
filing an IPR and not being the first to file a paragraph IV certification, it
can be subjected to market exclusion by the first file generic, no matter if
its IPR challenge is successful.245
4.

ANDA versus IPR: A Patent’s Presumptive Validity

Substantively, in ANDA litigation, the sitting judge can evaluate a
generic’s challenge to a drug patent’s validity under patentability, utility,
disclosure, novelty, and nonobviousness. 246 For the IPR judges to review
an IPR, the petitioner must show that there “is a reasonably likelihood of
success that the requester would prevail” against at least one of the claims
in the challenged patent.247 Truly, an IPR challenge would be granted if a
judge finds the challenger submitted sufficient anticipatory or obvious
prior art evidence that would render the patent invalid. 248 In this aspect,
the advantage goes to ANDA litigation in the number of opportunities and
ways to attack a drug patent.
But, drug patents in ANDA litigation enjoy a presumption of patent
validity, which means a challenger has the higher burden of proving a
patent is invalid with “clear and convincing evidence.”249 In contrast,
PTAB does not presume the drug patent invalid. 250 As a result, PTAB

241. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 22.
242. Quinn, supra note 190.
243. See Vicki G. Norton, Siegfried J.W. Ruppert, & Michael Swit, Successful Use of Inter
Partes Review to Cancel Claims Asserted in Parallel Litigation, Duane Morris Blog (Mar. 26,
2014), http://blogs.duanemorris.com/lifescienceslaw/2014/03/26/successful-use-of-inte
r-partes-review-to-cancel-claims-asserted-in-parallel-litigation.
244. See Apel, supra note 201.
245. See Norton, supra note 243 (stating why IPR “remains a viable option for later filing
generic companies.”).
246. Supra Part II.B.1.
247. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b).
248. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). IPR challenges are limited to using evidence of other patents
or printed publications as prior art to challenge a patent’s validity under novelty or
nonobviousness. Id.
249. See generally Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially
Viable Patents Invalid?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24
/ptab-death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48642/ (“The biggest
safeguard that a patentee enjoys at the district court is a presumption of validity, which is
not present to protect the patentee in proceedings before PTAB.”).
250. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2016).
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invalidates patents under a preponderance of the evidence standard. 251
What is even more favorable to IPR users is the fact that federal courts
have been more deferential to PTAB and its ability to make rules, enforce
those rules, and make decisions based on those rules. 252 Also, based on
PTAB’s use of the broadest reasonable interpretation to patent claims, 253
patents challenged under IPR are more likely to be invalidated by PTAB
than a drug patent in federal court because PTAB may consider “a broader
range of prior art than the district court.”254

B. IPR Statistics on Patent and
Bio/Pharma Patents: Patent Kill Rates
Even before the Federal Court of Appeals endorsed PTAB regarding
its rules and procedures,255 two years of IPR reporting have shown that
IPRs are quite combative to patents. 256 One study reviewing the first two
years of IPR proceedings has shown that (1) USPTO institutes IPR
petitions for at least one challenged claim 84% of the time, (2) USPTO
institutes IPRs for all challenged claims 74% of the time, and (3) PTAB
reached a final written decision, on the merits, and invalidated or
disclaimed all instituted claims more than 77% of the time. 257 As of
September 30, 2014, IPRs, on average, are filed at the rate of 75.1 per
month, for a total of 1,841 IPRs filed in IPR’s first two years.258 This IPR
filing per month rate is six times the IPX filing rate in IPX’s entire
history.259 In total, IPRs in the first two years have nearly totaled the
maximum number of IPX filings in IPX’s thirteen-year history.260

251. See e.g., Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute of Technology, No.
IPR2015-00010, Paper 29 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 21, 2016) (“For the reasons that follow, we
determine that Petitioner has met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that claims 1–5 and 10–17 of the ‘539 patent are unpatentable.”).
252. Bob Steinberg, Michael Morin & Davis Frazier, Let PTAB Decide: Federal Courts Are
Increasingly Deferring to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, CORP. COUNS. (Apr. 1, 2015),
www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202720053044/Let-the-PTAB-De
cide?slreturn=20150904215414. USPTO and its predecessor have applied the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard “to reduce the possibility that, after the patent is
granted, the claims may be interpreted as giving broader coverage than is justified.” In re
Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 756 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming the rulemaking authority of USPTO and that a decision to
institute an IPR is not judicially reviewable by statute nor are PTAB final written decision
on the matter).
253. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2016).
254. Mauri, supra note 119.
255. See text accompanying supra note 123.
256. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board began accepting petitions for IPR on September
16, 2012. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 319(c)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284, 304 (2011), see also Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Dialogue, Inter Partes Review: An
Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. REV. 93 n.1 (2014).
257. Love, supra note 256, at 97.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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In February 2015, PTAB “invalidated 93% of the claims from all
industries that reached a final written decision.” 261 In a new study that
analyzed over four hundred final written decisions by PTAB from
September 2012 through August 1, 2015, 88% of final written decisions
resulted in at least one claim being invalidated; 21% of all final written
decisions resulted in a complete patent invalidation; 82% of instituted
IPRs result in final written decisions that result in some type of patent
invalidation, thus “PTAB’s first impression of the petitions strength
appears to affect the entire proceeding and ultimate outcome.” 262 If IPRs
are so effective in invalidating patents, the concern is that if an IPR
invalidates a patented drug that is financially important to a
pharmaceutical company, it could seriously deter potential investors
from providing the funding that is needed to complete an NDA. These
results could potentially destroy an entire business and thereby result in
thousands of lost jobs.263
In February 2015, it was reported that IPR challenge rates against
biotech/pharmaceutical patents have tripled and the total number of
IPRs already filed in 2015 (73 as of March 26) has exceeded the total
number of combined IPRs filings against biotech/pharmaceutical patents
from 2012 to 2014.264 During the 2015 fiscal year, 167 of the total 1,897
AIA petitions have been petitions to challenge bio/pharma patents. 265
That is an increase from the 2012–2014 combined totals of 111
petitions.266 Pharmaceutical companies alone have filed a combined total
of 115 IPRs.267
Broken down further, of the bio/pharma petitions filed in the past
three years: 45 IPRs were filed in 2013, 91 IPRs were filed in 2014, and

261. Irena Royzman and Zhiqiang Liu, IPR Puts Biotech in the Crosshairs: A Forum to
Invalidate Patents Is Now Being Used on Biotech Firms; From the Experts, CORP. COUNS. (June
12, 2015), www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202726050369/IPR-Puts-Biotech-in-the-Crosshair
s.
262. Amy Simpson & Hwa Lee, PTAB Kill Rates: How IPRs Are Affecting Patents, LAW 360
(Sept. 15, 2015, 9:44 AM), www.law360.com/articles/699860/ptab-kill-rates-how-iprs-are
-affecting-patents. This study “analyzed all of the approximately 404 final written decisions
on instituted IPRs from September 2012 through Aug. 1, 2015, to explore the factors behind
IPR kill rates.” Id. The results ultimately represented “the number of patents that have been
invalidated in their entirety via IPRs,” as well as “the statistical impact that certain aspects
of the IPR petition have on the kill rate, including petitions to invalidate all claims in a patent
and petitions under § 102, § 103 or both.” Id.
263. See Gene Quinn, The Looming Patent Nightmare Facing the Pharmaceutical
Industry, IP WATCHDOG (July 8, 2015), www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/08/the-looming-pat
ent-nightmare-facing-the-pharmaceutical-industry/id=51428.
264. Royzman, supra note 261.
265. UNITED STATES PATENT, TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
STATISTICS (2015), www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-12-31%20PTAB.p
df.
266. Love, supra note 256, at 97.
267. Austin Donohue, IP Sessions at BIO 2015: The Impact of the Inter Partes Review on
(BIO)Pharma, BIOTECHNOW (June 24, 2015), www.biotech-now.org/public-policy/patentlybiotech/2015/06/ip-sessions-at-bio-2015-the-impact-of-the-inter-partes-review-onbiopharma.
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176 were filed in 2015, a yearly increase. 268 With respect to bio/pharma
IPRs: 51 are not yet decided, 61 have fallen under the settled/dismissed
category, and 193 have been instituted on the merits. 269 However, PTAB
is less likely to institute a bio/pharma petition, holding a 61% institution
rate compared to 72% all other tech challenges.270 Even if instituted,
bio/pharma claims are more likely to survive than any other technical
field.271 Their survival rate is still low because bio/pharma patents have
a 34.4% survival rate compared to the 13.4% survival rate in all other
technical fields.272 This is because pharmaceutical drugs are seen as the
“unpredictable arts,” and thus patent owners can argue more effectively
to save the patent.273
In 2016, PTAB began issuing its first PGR final decisions. 274 This
means an increase in bio/pharma challenges by both IPR and PGR. 275 In
2016, IPR and PGR institution rates have increased. 276 Examining a
combined 254 IPR and PGR decisions against bio/pharma patents, PTAB
instituted these petitions 65.7% of the time. 277 On all other patents,
institution rates have been at 66.8%.
Institution rates are understood to mean one, more, or all of a
patent’s claims will likely be invalidated, which means a win for the
patent challenger.278 In contrast, an IPR petition that is not instituted
means the patent is strong and it is a win for the patent holder.279

C. PTAB’s Decisions on CFAD’s
IPRs—the Effectiveness of Kyle Bass’s Strategy
A review of some of Kyle Bass’s IPR challenges, through CFAD, will
determine if they are consistent with the above-mentioned IPR statistics.

268. Mellissa Gibson & Ruben Munoz, IPR and Biopharma Patents: What the Statistics
Show, LS IPR (Nov. 11, 2015), www.akingump.com/images/content/3/9/v2/39881/IPRand-biopharma-patents-what-the-statistics-show-GF.pdf.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Thomas L. Irving et al., Nonobviousness in the U.S. Post-KSR for Innovative Drug
Companies, FINNEGAN (Oct. 2009), www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.asp
x?news=72b65383-ff4e-4d71-a15c-019ca60e1d30.
274. Mathew Bultman, In 1st-Ever PGR Decisions, PTAB Nixes Livestock Patents, LAW 360
(June 13, 2016), www.law360.com/articles/806355/in-1st-ever-pgr-decisions-ptab-nixeslivestock-patents.
275. PTAB Analytics Indicate Record Highs for Bio/Pharma IPR/PGR Institution Rates,
DOCKET REPORT (Nov. 2, 2016), http://docketreport.blogspot.com/2016/11/ptab-analyticsindicate-record-highs.html.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. John T. Aquino, Inter Partes Review Patent Challenges Bedevil Biopharmas,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 21, 2016), www.bna.com/inter-partes-review-n73014447528.
279. Id.
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A Review of PTAB’s Decision Not to Institute CFAD IPRs 280

In PTAB’s first review of CFAD’s first IPR petition, PTAB decided that
the prior art references that CFAD presented were not sufficient to be
considered printed publications that would invalidate Acorda’s patent
under the nonobviousness requirement. 281 Even though PTAB did not
mention Kyle Bass and CFAD’s “short activist strategy,” PTAB’s reasons
for siding against CFAD raises the question of whether PTAB took into
account who the IPR petitioners were and thereby stretched its
substantive findings to not institute CFAD’s IPR.282 One day after PTAB
denied instituting CFAD’s IPR challenge against Acorda, Acorda’s stock
increased from $28.96 per share to $35.15 per share, likely resulting from
confidence in the patent’s strength.283
Similar criticisms were directed to PTAB’s rejection of CFAD’s
subsequent IPR challenge of Biogen’s patents. 284 Specifically, in CFAD’s
challenge against Biogen’s MS drug, PTAB rejected CFAD’s contention
that Biogen’s MS patent claims were obvious because of the public
availability of clinical information on a similar drug’s phase II trials. 285
PTAB reviewed the information on the phase II drug trials and ruled that
it was not the type of printed publication that would breach the
“likelihood of success” standard threshold of invalidating the patent

280. Institution decisions are final and not appealable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d).
281. Coalition for Affordable Drugs (ADROCA) LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., No.
IPR2015-00817, Paper 12 (PTAB Aug. 14, 2015). CFAD issued an IPR against two of Acorda’s
patents related to its multiple sclerosis drug. Id. PTAB first ruled that Acorda’s information
disclosure statements (IDS) about two posters it had presented at industry meetings did not
constitute an admittance of material prior art. Id. The two posters at the Acorda industry
meeting had detailed information about Acorda’s MS drug Ampyra. Id. Also after reviewing
the two posters, PTAB found that CFAD presented “insufficient evidence” that these two
posters were sufficient prior art printed publications that would invalidate Acorda’s drug
patents. Id.; In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (ruling that there are
four considerations for a prior art to qualify as a printed publication: (1) the length of time
the display was exhibited, (2) the expertise of the target audience, (3) the existence (or lack
thereof) of reasonable expectations that the material displayed would not be copied, and
(4) the simplicity or ease with which the material displayed could have been copied).
282. See Gene Quinn, USPTO Denies Kyle Bass IPR Patent Challenge against Acorda
Therapeutics, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 25, 2015), www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/08/25/usptodenies-kyle-bass-ipr-patent-challenge-against-acorda-therapeutics/id=61016 (“I have to
wonder whether this decision represents a shift in the worldview of PTAB or whether they
sought out a reason to deny the petition because it was filed by Kyle Bass. Unfortunately, I
suspect these two denials have everything to do with who was behind the challenge and
little to do with the merits of the challenge.”).
283. Id.
284. Gene Quinn, With Dubious Logic and Inaccurate Statements of Law, PTAB Denies
Another Kyle Bass IPR Petition, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 2, 2015), www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/09/
02/ptab-denies-another-kyle-bass-ipr-petition/id=61333; Gene Quinn, Kyle Bass IPR
Challenge Moves Forward, What Does It Mean?, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 12, 2015), www.ipwatchd
og.com/2015/10/12/kyle-bass-ipr-challenge-moves-foward-what-does-it-mean-forpatent-reform/id=62449.
285. Coalition for Affordable Drugs (ADROCA) LLC v. Biogen MA, Inc., No. IPR201501136, Paper 23 at 16 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2015). CFAD challenged Patent Claims 1–20. Id.
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claims CFAD sought to invalidate. 286 Again, PTAB denied instituting the
IPR on what may be considered faulty reasoning. 287 PTAB determined
that the written description of the phase II studies was not a printed
publication, yet without explanation, it still relied on its contents to
decide that the phase II trials constituted public use, when it was clear
that the drug studied in the phase II trials was used to find MS (as that is
exactly what the written description said the trials were meant for). 288
Thus, PTAB’s use of the phase II trials’ written description to deny the
institution of IPR “can be described only as [. . .] horribly disingenuous”
because the written description is prior art publication that can be used
to invalidate Biogen’s patent.289 Once again, PTAB’s decision appears to
be based more on denying CFAD than on denying the IPR pursuant to
established law.290
PTAB also denied CFAD’s IPR petitions against Jazz
Pharmaceuticals’ narcolepsy drug Xyrem291 and Pharmacyclics Inc.’s
cancer drug Imbruvica.292 PTAB rejected CFAD’s claim that the Xyrem
patent was obvious because the prior art was not publicly available and
the combination of the prior art would not be sufficient for a person
having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA)293 to practice the patented
drug.294 In a change of tone, PTAB criticized CFAD’s efforts in providing

286. Id. at 9–11. Challenge 1—Kappos et al. Pilot study: Kappos concerned a pilot study.
The Board identified multiple deficiencies associated with the pilot study of Kappos,
ultimately finding that “Petitioner [had] failed to establish that Kappos teaches that DMF
would be useful for treating MS. Id. Challenge 2—ClinicalTrials as prior art: PTAB found that
ClinicalTrials was not prior art printed publication. As a test, PTAB assumed it was prior art,
and even under this assumption the Board found ClinicalTrials to be “deficient as a prior art
teaching of DMF being useful to treat MS for many of the same reasons that Kappos is
deficient.” Id. at 12–14. Challenge 3—Admissions said to have been in the ʼ514 Patent and
ICH Guideline: the Board declined to address the issue of whether an “admission” per se can
form the basis of an IPR challenge. Instead, the Board indicated that even if an “admission”
could be relied upon for this purpose, the alleged “admission” in the instant proceeding
failed as prior art like the Kappos and ClinicalTrials challenges. Id. at 14–16.
287. See Quinn, supra note 284. “Clearly, one of skill in the art familiar with FDA
processes and clinical trials would have thought it obvious to try DMF for treating multiple
sclerosis after having read the description in the Kappos reference.” Id.; see generally KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). “In that instance the fact that a
combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103.” Id.
288. Quinn, supra note 284.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Vin Gurrieri, PTAB Again Rejects Kyle Bass AIA Review of Drug Patent, LAW 360 (Oct.
16, 2015, 4:40 PM), www.law360.com/lifesciences/articles/715126.
292. Kelly Knaub, PTAB Denies Another Kyle Bass Petition for Drug Review, LAW 360 (Oct.
20, 2015, 4:41 PM), www.law360.com/ip/articles/716375.
293. A person having ordinary skill in the art is similar in theory to the reasonable
person standard but in this case it refers to a person in a particular technical field, for
example, in the drug field it could be an ordinary pharmacologist or an ordinary organic
chemist or an ordinary inorganic chemist who has available to them all present knowledge
about pharmacology and whether that hypothetical person could come up with the invented
drug in question. See text accompanying supra note 103.
294. Coalition For Affordable Drugs III LLC v. Jazz Pharms., Inc., No. IPR2015-01018
Paper 17 at 12, 18–21 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 15, 2015). The Drug Advisory Committee (DAC)
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sufficient evidence to warrant the institution of IPR, stating that CFAD
“does not offer reasons why a [PHOSITA] would ‘cobble together
disclosures from these disparate references’ that are not related to the
same endeavor.”295 The prior art failed to anticipate or make Imbruvica
obvious because it was insufficient to be considered a printed
publication.296
2.

PTAB Institutes Several CFAD IPR Challenges and Their Final Written
Decisions

In October of 2015, PTAB, for the first time, instituted an IPR filed by
Kyle Bass and CFAD against Cosmo Technology’s patent on Mesalazine, a
drug used to treat Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis.297 PTAB agreed,
for the most part, with CFAD that a PHOSITA would find the Mesalazine
patent obvious because a prior-existing patent and a printed publication
teach several claims of the Mesalazine patent. 298
But approximately one year later, PTAB sided against CFAD and held
that the prior art was not enough to meet the preponderance of the
evidence standard to invalidate Cosmo’s patent. 299 Particularly, PTAB
found that CFAD’s definition of a disputed term in the claims of the patent
were “outweighed significantly by non-patent extrinsic evidence in the
form of relevant treatises, textbooks, and dictionaries that chemically
define [that term,]” and thus, CFAD’s prior art did not apply to Cosmo’s
patent.300 Ultimately, PTAB stated CFAD’s obvious challenge against
transcripts were prior art in question. Id.
295. Id. at 20. Even though PTAB denied CFAD’s IPR, PTAB once again came to CFAD’s
defense by saying that CFAD’s “short activist strategy” is not contrary to the AIA’s
Congressional intent, nor is there anything illegal with CFAD’s strategy because having a
financial motivation for filing IPR occurs all the time and is not sanctionable Id. at 10–12.
PTAB’s rejection of CFAD’s IPR against Pharmacyclics was based on their decision that
NCT00849654, a published clinical phase I trial document, describing the clinical trials
conducted by Pharmacyclics did not anticipate nor make the Imbruvica patent obvious. Id.
at 2.
296. Id. at 6. CFAD failed to provide “probative evidence that supports its assertions, or
that is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that NCT00849654 was publically
accessible before the critical date.” Id. PTAB found that CFAD failed to explain the meaning
of certain dates found on the website where NCT00849645 was available and CFAD failed
to provide evidence of the websites publishing practices, including how the website
disseminates its information and thus, “[w]ithout such information, there is no support for
a conclusion that NCT00849654 was publicly accessible by February 2, 2009, as Petitioner
asserts.” Id. at 8.
297. Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. Cosmo Technologies LTD., No. IPR201500988, Paper 8 at 2–3 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2015).
298. Id. at 3. The patent is the Leslie, U.S. Patent No. 3,965,256, filed June 5, 1974, issued
June 22, 1976 (Leslie) (Ex. 1003) and the printed publication is Groenendaal et al., EP Appl.
Publ. No. 0 375 063 A1, filed Dec. 18, 1989, published on June 27, 1990 (Groenendaal) (Ex.
1005). Id.
299. Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. Cosmo Technologies LTD., No. IPR201500988, Paper 55 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 5, 2016).
300. Id. at 10–12. CFAD argued that the term “waxes” in the patent’s first claim referred
to cetyl alcohol and cetostearyl alcohol, but PTAB sided with Cosmo in that “waxes” “has a
specific chemical definition that does not include cetyl alcohol” and cetostearyl alcohol. Id.
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Cosmo’s patent was “a close call, but certainly not a strong case.” 301
According to PTAB, CFAD’s prior art is unpersuasive in making Cosmo’s
patent obvious, and criticized its attempted attack by stating that its
“challenge is more akin to ‘merely throw[ing] metaphorical darts at a
board filled with combinatorial prior art possibilities’ when the prior art
gave little or conflicting indications as to which parameters were critical
or which of many possible choices were likely to be successful.” 302
In another case, PTAB instituted, in part, CFAD’s IPR against NPS
Pharmaceuticals Inc.’s patent covering Gattex, a drug used to treat short
bowel syndrome.303 In this case, PTAB found that the combination of
prior-existing patents, which disclosed information on the Gattex drug,
would have been obvious to a PHOSITA with respect to how to create the
drug.304 One year later, PTAB ultimately agreed and invalidated most of
the patent claims covering Gattex.305 NPS has appealed the final written
decision to the Federal Circuit.306
In another win for Kyle Bass and CFAD, PTAB decided to institute an
IPR against two Celgene patents related to the cancer drugs Thalomid,
Revlimid, and Pomalyst.307 PTAB held that a combination of journal
articles and the fact that the three drugs may contain thalidomide (or are
similar to it) would make Celgene’s patented method obvious to a
PHOSITA.308 In a final written decision, PTAB ultimately “found that
Celgene Corp. patents related to the cancer drugs Thalomid, Reylimid,
and Pomalyst are invalid.”309 Celgene has yet to appeal the decision to the
Federal Circuit.310

at 11–13.
301. Id. at 23.
302. Id. at 18–19 (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
303. Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. NPS Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. IPR201500990 and IPR2015-01093, Paper 26 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2015).
304. Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. NPS Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. IPR201501093 Paper 26 at 19 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2015); see Vin Gurrieri, Kyle Bass-Backed Group Gets
PTAB to Review Gattex Patent, Law 360 (Oct. 26, 2015, 5:25 PM), www.law360.com/ip/ar
ticles/718885.
305. See Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. NPS Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. IPR201500990, Paper 68 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 2016); Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. NPS
Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. IPR2015-01093, Paper 67 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 2016).
306. Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. NPS Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. IPR201501093, Notice of Appeal (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2016).
307. Ryan Davis, Kyle Bass Group Gets PTAB to Review 2 Celgene Patents, LAW 360 (Oct.
27, 2015, 8:38 PM), www.law360.com/articles/719428/kyle-bass-group-gets-ptab-to-re
view-2-celgene-patents.
308. Id. CFAD challenged patents that cover a computerized method of distributing the
three drugs to keep them from being used by pregnant women. Id. PTAB said the claims of
the patent are “likely obvious in view of earlier systems for ensuring that pregnant women
cannot access drugs that could harm a fetus.” Id.
309. Davis supra note 307; Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI LLC v. Celgene Corp., No.
IPR2015-01102, IPR2015-01103, IPR2015-01092, and IPR2015-01096 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27,
2016).
310. An IPR final written decision may be appealed directly to the Federal Circuit. 35
U.S.C. § 319 (2016). A notice of appeal must be made within 63 days of the final written
decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 90.3 (2016).
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D. No IPR Exemption for Hatch Waxman,
But Reverse Payments Are Still an Issue
1.

Kyle Bass’s Losing Battle

As of October 2015, Kyle Bass has experienced mixed results in his
IPR challenges, most of which have been unfavorable. Kyle Bass and CFAD
have filed thirty-three IPRs,311 and PTAB has decided seventeen of those
petitions.312 Out of the seventeen decisions, PTAB has agreed to institute
seven of Kyle Bass’s and CFAD’s IPRs and to reject ten.313 This essentially
shows a 59% denial rate with respect to CFAD’s IPR challenges. 314 Overall,
USPTO statistics have shown that PTAB has denied IPRs on the merits at
a 30% rate, and thus instituted IPRs at a 70% rate, on average. 315 At this
point in time, based on this sample size, CFAD, on the merits of these
decisions, has “been denied [institution] approximately 2 times more
than the average.”316 In comparison to how many IPRs are instituted
against the bio/pharma industry overall, CFAD is faring slightly better. 317
Of the six challenges that reached a final written decision, five
resulted in having a drug patent’s claims (some or all) invalidated. 318 On
paper, Kyle Bass’s strategy appears to be a success, but not an
“overwhelming success.”319 But, after two years, others argue that Kyle
Bass’s “short activist strategy” has been a “failure.” 320 Despite his success
at invalidating five patents as well as achieving a higher IPR institution
rate compared to other bio/pharma challenges, Kyle Bass’s strategy has

311. Katherine L. Neville, Coalition for Affordable Drugs PTAB Scorecard, PTAB WATCH
(Oct. 30, 2015), www.ptabwatch.com/2015/10/coalition-for-affordable-drugs-ptab-scorec
ard. In these cases, multiple IPR challenges have been filed against the same patent. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Ryan Davis, USPTO Asks Congress to Change Some AIA Petition Rules, LAW 360 (Oct.
2, 2015, 4:48 PM), www.law360.com/ip/articles/710386 (USPTO has asked Congress to
pass legislation to relax the “real parties of interest” (RPI) requirement that USPTO
currently identifies as “too strict” because it terminates a petition for failing to identify the
correct RPI in their IPR, PGR, or CBM petition.). This also can be seen as an institution rate
of 41%. Id.
315. Neville, supra note 311.
316. Id.
317. Tasha M. Francis, Kyle Bass Group Gets PTAB to Review 4 Celgene Patents, LEXOLOGY
(Oct. 28, 2015), www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f426cc1a-ce41-4347-8640-9e10
49f5a6c4. Approximately, a total of 74 bio/pharma IPRs were filed so far in 2015. Id. IPRs
were instituted in 28.4% of the cases, granted in part in 20.3% of the cases, and denied in
51.4% of the cases. Id.
318. Tasha M. Francis and Tucker N. Tehufen, Kyle Bass Is on a Roll: Four More Wins at
PTAB, FISH & RICHARDSON (Nov. 1, 2016), www.fr.com/fish-patent/kyle-bass-is-on-a-roll-fo
ur-more-wins-at-the-ptab.
319. Mathew Bultman, Hedge Fund Drug Patent Challenges in Doubt after Bass’ Test, LAW
360 (Mar. 31, 2017), www.law360.com/articles/908491.
320. Id.
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had “a lack of apparent success betting against pharmaceutical
companies’ stock.”321
While stock prices initially dropped when Kyle Bass filed his first
few challenges, “subsequent filings and final decisions invalidating
patents did not seem to cause major fluctuations in the stock price. In
some instances, the price actually went up.” 322 Someone who “shorts the
stock” would not benefit from these results, and this trend does not
appear likely to change because “as time wore on, the stock market better
understood the uncertainties that come along with filing an IPR petition
and were less influenced by it.”323 Also, the lack of financial success in the
strategy has not led to copycats, further suggesting that the shorting
strategy is not successful.324
Besides PTAB rejecting CFDA’s IPRs under questionable
reasoning,325 some have argued against the merit of CFAD’s challenges,
stating that CFAD simply may not be submitting strong evidence to
invalidate these pharmaceutical patents, which “suggests that CFAD may
be less about making a strong case against the validity of the patents and
more about the quick monetary gain of their ‘short activist strategy.’” 326
There is also an inherent flaw in Kyle Bass’s strategy. A drug
company defending against an IPR challenge still has the opportunity to
appeal the final written decision to the Federal Circuit because there is an
identifiable harm to its patent property.327 CFAD may not. For example, if
one of CFAD’s IPR challenges reaches a final written decision, CFAD may
be denied appellate review because CFAD “cannot identify any harm that
it has suffered by losing the IPR,” and thus lacks standing to argue the case
at the Federal Circuit.328
321. Id. PTAB instituted CFAD challenges 56% of the time while the overall institution
rate for bio/pharma is at 61%. Id. In CFAD cases that reached a final written decision, 54%
of the challenged claims were held unpatentable, compared to the overall invalidation rate
of 39%. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See Quinn, supra note 284; see also Bultman, supra note 319 (CFAD finding that
PTAB demonstrated a “cynical attitude” in their decisions against instituting CFAD’s IPR
petitions).
326. Neville, supra note 311.
327. See generally Mathew Bultman, Fed. Cir. Overturns PTAB in 2nd-Ever AIA Reversal,
Law 360 (Nov. 5, 2015, 6:57 PM), www.law360.com/ip/articles/723756 (reporting that the
Federal Circuit disagreed with PTAB’s invalidation of only four patent claims, ruling on
appeal that all six claims of Belden Inc.’s patent on a method for making a communications
cable); see also Ryan Davis, 3 Takeaways from First-Ever Fed. Cir. AIA Reversal, LAW 360 (June
19, 2015, 8:53 PM), www.law360.com/articles/670203/3-takeaways-from-first-ever-fedcirc-aia-reversal (reporting that the Federal Circuit reversed PTAB’s final written decision
invalidating several claims of Proxyconn’s data access patent by way of prior art anticipation
or obviousness because the Federal Circuit found that PTAB “relied on incorrect claim
constructions and remanded for further proceedings.”).
328. Scott Kamholz, Can Kyle Bass Appeal His IPR Loss? Not If Consumer Watchdog Is on
the Prowl, PTAB BLOG (Oct. 8, 2016), www.ptab-blog.com/2016/10/08/can-kyle-bass-ap
peal-his-ipr-loss-not-if-consumer-watchdog-is-on-the-prowl; see generally Consumer
Watchdog v. WARF, 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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Finally, Kyle Bass is not reaching his stated goal of lowering drug
prices for the public by helping generic drugs enter the market.329 The
drug patents that CFAD did challenge and obtain a final written decision
invalidating claims, like the Gattex patent, have multiple different patents
covering it, and are thus robustly protected. 330 Records indicate that of
the drugs CFAD challenged that are protected by multiple different
patents, CFAD only challenged “a subset” of those patents, putting into
question whether they truly followed through with their goal helping
generic drugs enter the market.331
2.

IPRs and Reverse Payment Agreements Are Still an Issue for HatchWaxman

Kyle Bass’s strategy has so far failed to help introduce generic drugs
into the market place to lower healthcare costs, and it is unlikely that
others will follow his model due to its lack of success. 332 But, IPR can still
be an issue for the drug industry. Overall, ANDA litigation was created to
provide a much simpler way to receive FDA drug approval by bypassing
the cumbersome and lengthy requirements associated with filing a
NDA.333 But IPR on paper (and possibly in practice), can do a better job.
IPRs cost $300,000 and may take up to eighteen months for a final written
decision to be issued.334 Litigation to invalidate a patent through the
federal court system may cost up to $3 million and take years to
complete.335 Further, under IPR, there is no Article III standing
requirement or risk of infringement.336
Generic brands that are not the first to file may use IPR to challenge
drug patents.337 Compared to filing an IPR petition, a generic company
faces more risks when filing a paragraph IV ANDA application. Generally,
a generic brand that loses a paragraph IV challenge can be faced with an
injunction that would prevent it from introducing its generic drug into the

329. Bultman, supra note 319.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 17.
334. See Herman, supra note 225, at 1795 n.41. IPR, including attorney’s fees can cost
anywhere from $300,000 to $1 million depending on the firm. Id. In contrast ANDA litigation
in federal court on average, including attorney’s fees, can cost up to $10 million. Id.
335. Ed Silverman, Innovate or Else: Kyle Bass Strikes Again and Challenges Shire Patents,
WALL ST. J. BLOG PHARMALOT (Apr. 2, 2015, 5:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/
04/02/innovate-or-else-kyle-bass-strikes-again-and-challenges-shire-patents.
336. Quinn, supra note 190 (discussing the drug industry lamenting IPR process and
wanting drugs to be insulated from it because “the IPR provisions do not include a standing
requirement, which means that anyone can bring an IPR for any reason.”).
337. Gurpreet Singh Walia, Inter Partes Review as an Option as a Substitute for HatchWaxman Litigation, INS. COUNS. (Nov. 7, 2014), www.insidecounsel.com/2014/11/07/interpartes-review-an-option-as-a-substitute-for. “Petitioning for an IPR may be a very
attractive route to potentially invalidate patent claims for generics” who were not first to
file a paragraph IV ANDA and thus “do not have the 180-day market exclusivity incentive.”
Id.
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market until the NDA/patent expires. 338 Under the right circumstances a
trial court, in addition to granting an injunction, can award damages
against a generic infringer “only if there has been commercial
manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United States or
importation into the United States of an approved drug or veterinary
biological product.”339 This scenario is called an “at risk” launch, which
may result in a generic brand being “financially destroyed.” 340
Under IPR, generic brands can initially avoid the ANDA risk by
employing a dual-pronged attack strategy to take multiple shots at a drug
patent.341 While parties are estopped from bringing IPR final written
decisions into district court and final district court judgments into PTAB,
IPR institution decisions are not estopped from brining those claims into
district court.342 So if a generic fails at getting an IPR instituted, it can take
those claims into district court.343 Also, with IPR having more technically
proficient judges, a generic may employ the strategy of filing its most
complex arguments with PTAB, while filing its patentability and
disclosure arguments in federal court. 344 Finally, many questions remain
as to whether an IPR final written decision can trigger the 180-day
market exclusivity period or trigger the “failure to market” forfeiture
provision.345
Despite Kyle Bass’s perceived failure, these IPR questions, IPR
strategies, IPR statistics towards bio/pharma, and IPR overall, still have
the drug industry concerned.346 The drug industry thinks IPR’s high
bio/pharma patent invalidation rates are too high and that there needs to
be more patent certainty.347 The “patent cliff” is real, as a brand name
drug company drug “often loses more than 80 to 90% of the market
within six months” of a patent’s expiration. 348 Also, now that drug patents
are subject to IPR, Hatch-Waxman, and antitrust scrutiny, drug patent
investors may be scared off from investing in new drugs, which can shut
down funding for scientists who may be on the verge of discovering lifechanging medicine.349
338. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 242; 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B). See generally In re
Omepraole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
339. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(C).
340. DORSNEY, supra note 42 at 17.
341. Mauri, supra note 123.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. Under the forfeiture provision, a first file generic forfeits 180-exclusivity if it
fails to market its generic drug within the time proscribed by statute. Id.
346. Aquino, supra note 278.
347. Id.
348. New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 2015).
349. Leanne Miller, Biotech CEO: Bass Exploiting Weakness in System, CNBC FAST MONEY
(Sept. 19, 2015), www.cnbc.com/2015/09/19/biotech-ceo-bass-exploiting-weakness-insystem.html; see also Austin Frakt, How Patent Law Can Block Even Lifesaving Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/upshot/how-patent-law-can-bloc
k-even-lifesaving-drugs.html?_r=0 (discussing the high cost of creating a new drug as well
as issues in the drug industry that affect how companies avoid to create risk in the industry).
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But IPR exemption is not the solution because it is estimated that
“federal spending would increase by $1.3 billion over 10 years because
the exemption would delay” generic drug entry. 350 Invalidating a
pharmaceutical patent “would save the government money as the result
of cheaper generics becoming immediately available on the market if a
patent were to fall.”351 USPTO believes that the IPR process is doing its
job and that the high patent invalidity rates are a result of the previous
patent law regime that “approved way too many ‘bad’ patents in the past
that should never have made it out the door.”352
Reverse payment agreements are still an issue that places doubts on
whether Hatch-Waxman can deliver generic drugs to market. As Senator
Hatch, a co-sponsor of the Act stated, the Hatch-Waxman Act was not
meant to “encourage” Reverse payment agreements where generic
brands are paid “not to sell generic drugs and not to allow multi-source
competition.”353 Brand names know that only the paragraph IV challenge
matters because paragraphs I–III do not include any incentive, and thus
“no one wants to pay for the patent litigation where the results will wind
up benefitting many free riders that did not fund the litigation.” 354 As a
result, reverse payment agreements “reversed” the Hatch-Waxman
incentive framework by targeting the first to file generic brands. Brand
names were successful at delaying entry because “brand firms value
deterring entry, on average, at $4.6 billion . . . generic firms value the right
to enter [with the 180-day market exclusivity] at $236.8 million
dollars.”355
In 2013, FTC reported consumers had to pay over $3 billion in
higher drug prices because of reverse payment agreements.356 Also, there
are doubts as to whether the antitrust scrutiny from Actavis will have an
impact on curbing these agreements. Post-Actavis, several district courts
opinions upheld reverse payment agreements as lawful. 357 Finally, there
are doubts that the rule of reason analysis, as applied in Actavis, will be
sufficient to police reverse payment agreements. In one study looking at
over several hundred antitrust cases, focusing on rule of reason cases that
were decided on the merits, courts sided with the defendant 96% of the
time.358

350. Joseph Walker, Drug Industry Rule Would Raise Medicare, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2015,
7:20 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/drug-industry-bill-would-raise-medicare-costs-1441063
248.
351. Id.
352. See Pitts, supra note 13.
353. 148 CONG. REC. S7566 (daily ed. July 30, 2002) (Statement of Se. Hatch).
354. Quinn, supra note 16.
355. Dennis Crouch, Economics: Explaining Reverse Payments in ANDA Litigation,
PATENTLY-O (Oct. 28, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/10/economics-explaininglitigation.html.
356. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), http://ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
357. Thomas, supra note 27, at 10.
358. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 829–30 (2009).
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Considering the drug industries’ qualms with PTAB’s “Death Squad”
reputation,359 and the continued issues with reverse payment
agreements, there is a legitimate need to pass logical Hatch-Waxman
reform to curb the high price of generic drugs while avoiding the
plausible negative drug industry trends that can interrupt
pharmaceutical innovation.360 Instead of asking for exemption, Big
Pharma, generic brands, and consumers should seek comprehensive
Hatch-Waxman reform.

IV. PROPOSAL
A compromise between Big Pharma and IPR supporters is the best
way to preserve Congressional intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act. I propose
an amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act that will create a new
regulatory regime in two parts. First, the IPR process and procedure
should be integrated into the Hatch-Waxman Act as a new paragraph V
challenge to invigorate and modernize the outdated Act, much like IPR
invigorated the AIA. This new paragraph V challenge, which will be
discussed below, will act as an alternative to paragraph IV challenges and
provide incentives to complete ANDA adjudication. Furthermore, a
separated administrative agency that solely focuses on pharmaceutical
patents alone will need to be created. This new drug patent approval
administration (DPAA) will work with the FDA and FTC and review and
adjudicate all ANDA drug challenges to help alleviate the ANDA backlog
that is plaguing the FDA, which can lead to an increase in lower-priced
drugs for the public.361
Second, the next part of the new Hatch-Waxman regulatory regime
will be to add a new remedies section to the Act. This remedies section
will not only allow the DPAA to police parties’ behaviors, but it will also
provide financial penalties for violators. Where PTAB is limited in its
ability to investigate IPR abuse, the DPAA, under this newly proposed
remedies section, will have the ability to examine the quality all
pharmaceutical patent challenges. This remedy section will be further
discussed below.
These amendments are purposely designed to combat the issues of
reverse payment systems, penalties for Act violations, and provide a
regulatory barrier between drug companies and antitrust scrutiny.
However, before proceeding with a more detailed description of these
new elements and how this new drug patent system will generally work,

359. See Pitts, supra note 13.
360. See Quinn, supra note 11.
361. Zachary Brennan, What FDA Can and Can’t Do to Help Lower Rising Drug Prices,
RAPS (Nov. 18, 2015), www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/11/18/23635/WhatFDA-Can-and-Can%E2%80%99t-Do-to-Help-Lower-Rising-Drug-Prices. “[The] FDA is
having some issues addressing the gargantuan backlog of nearly 3,000 ANDAs and the
median approval time for an ANDA has increased from about 30 months in 2011 to 48
months in 2014.” Id.
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an explanation for the inspiration of this new system is first described
below.

A. Amendment Inspiration: Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP
and the Telecommunications Act of 1996
In Trinko, a New York based telephone service customer (the
“Customer”) sued Verizon Communications Inc. (Verizon), alleging that
Verizon violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996 362 (1996 Act) and
in turn violated section 2363 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.364 Before the
filing and the resolution of this case, the New York Public Service
Commission (PSC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
investigated the alleged violation and ultimately imposed financial
penalties on Verizon, among other available remedial measures under the
1996 Act.365 However, while these penalties were applied, the Customer
continued with its complaint.366
Essentially, the Customer alleged that Verizon, as the “incumbent
local exchange carrier” (also known as the “established network
provider” in New York State), had a duty under the 1996 Act to share its
network with other “new entrant” competitors, and breached this duty
when it failed to meet these obligations. 367 Specifically, this breach
occurred because Verizon filled orders on a “discriminatory basis as part
of an anticompetitive scheme to discourage customers from becoming or
remaining customers of [competitors] in violation of § 2 of the Sherman
Act.”368 Without access to Verizon’s network, a competitor cannot fill its
customers’ orders, and Verizon devised this anticompetitive scheme to
prevent its own customers from switching to other carriers or deter
potential customers from choosing its competitors.369
The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed
the complaint, finding that the Customer’s allegations of “deficient
assistance to rivals failed to satisfy § 2’s requirements.”370 The Second
Circuit reversed and reinstated the Customer’s complaint.371 Upon grant
of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Second
Circuit’s ruling, concluding that the Customer’s complaint that Verizon’s
362. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2017).
363. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2017).
364. Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 402–
05 (2004).
365. Id. at 403–04 (“Verizon undertook to make a ‘voluntary contribution’ to the U.S.
Treasury in the amount of $3 million; under the PSC orders, Verizon incurred liability to the
competitive LECs in the amount of $10 million.” (citations omitted)).
366. Id. at 404. The Customer filed a complaint on behalf of a class of similar customers
in the District Court of the Southern District of New York. Id.
367. Id. at 404–05; 47 U.S.C. § 251(c).
368. Id. at 404.
369. Id. at 405.
370. Id.
371. Id.
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breach of its duty to share under the 1996 Act did not constitute a
recognizable cause of action under section 2 of the Sherman Act.372
The Trinko decision describes several important principles that are
especially important to structuring this comment’s proposal to amend the
Hatch-Waxman Act. First, of important note, is the regulatory scheme of
the 1996 Act. The 1996 Act, which applies to local incumbent multibilliondollar telecommunication networks like Verizon and AT&T, 373
established a “complex regime for monitoring and enforcement” that
imposes sharing duties on incumbent local telecommunication
companies to give its competitors a fair opportunity to compete in that
market.374 The court recognized that the 1996 Act made sharing
compulsory between “rivals and at considerable expense and effort.” 375
This was supported by the fact that “[n]ew systems must be designed and
implemented simply to make that access possible . . . .” 376
Moreover, this also relates to an important aspect of the Court’s
decision concerning whether there is a duty to deal or compete.
Specifically, the Court found that, absent the duties imposed by the 1996
Act, antitrust law did not impose on competitors a duty to deal or impose
Sherman section 2 liabilities on competitors who refused to deal with
each other.377
Finally, the last aspect of Trinko that is important to this comment’s
Proposal is the Court’s recognition of the 1996 Act’s regulatory scheme.
More exactly, the Act did not utterly preclude antitrust scrutiny, 378 but
simply asserted that alleged injured parties can pursue remedies
available under the Act before filing antitrust claims in federal court. 379
The existence of a regulatory structure was important to the Court:
One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory
structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where such
structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust

372. Id. at 414–16.
373. See generally Liyan Chen, The World’s Largest Telecom Companies: China Mobile
Beats Verizon, AT&T Again, FORBES (June 1, 2015), www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015
/06/01/the-worlds-largest-telecom-companies-china-mobile-beats-verizon-att-again/#fe
5658a4df4d (showing that China Mobile’s market value is estimated at $250 billion
compared to Verizon $206.2 billion and AT&T at $234.2 billion).
374. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 401.
375. Id. at 410.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 408; but cf. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
601 (1985) (ruling, under limited circumstances, competitors who refuse to cooperate with
each other can be subject to antitrust liability).
378. See 47 U.S.C. § 601(b)(1) (2017); but cf. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406. “In some respects
the enforcement scheme set up by the 1996 Act is a good candidate for implication of
antitrust immunity, to avoid the real possibility of judgments conflicting with the agency’s
regulatory scheme ‘that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust
laws.’” Id. (citing United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975)).
While the 1996 Act did not preclude antitrust scrutiny, it did not impose new antitrust
standards on litigating parties. Id. at 407.
379. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406; 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2017).
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enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the
antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.380

Under the 1996 Act, Verizon was already subject to FCC and PSC
oversight, and both agencies effectively responded to Verizon’s violations
under the Act by imposing fines and other burdens on it. 381 As the Court
concluded, the 1996 Act presented a complex regulatory scheme that
employed stricter anticompetitive regulation, much more than what
antitrust law provided, in preventing the formation of anticompetitive
monopolies.382 This demonstrated that the 1996 Act’s regulatory regime
was more suited to deal with anticompetitive issues and violations made
by the parties involved in this particular telecommunication industry. 383
Implementation of these principles learned from Trinko and the
1996 Act through a Hatch-Waxman amendment will become clearer in
the following section.

B. Creating a New Paragraph V Challenge to
Re-incentivize the Hatch-Waxman Act
Prior to the passing of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress concluded
“that the [Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] was cumbersome to the
drug approval process and delayed the entry of relatively inexpensive
generic drugs into the market place.” 384 Now, reverse payment
agreements have caused the Hatch-Waxman Act to become the most
cumbersome problem for low-cost generic drug entry.385 As some patent
experts have asserted, Hatch-Waxman has been a “failure” and “is not the
answer” in ensuring quick generic drug market entry. 386 In contrast, there
are several advantages to IPR that make it “undeniably far more effective
at achieving the stated goal of Hatch-Waxman.”387
As aforementioned,388 one of the main concerns that reverse
payment agreements present is that these agreements may protect
invalid patents, which could result in artificially high drug prices. 389
Remember, when a paragraph IV challenge is made, the challenger
asserts either that their generic drug does not infringe or that the

380. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412.
381. Id. at 412–13.
382. Id. at 412, 416. “The regulatory framework that exists in this case demonstrates
how, in certain circumstances, regulation significantly diminishes the likelihood of major
antitrust harm . . . [t]he 1996 Act is in an important respect much more ambitious than the
antitrust laws.” Id.
383. Id.
384. Construction and Application of Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 and 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e) (1994)), 180
A.L.R. Fed. 487, 2a.
385. See supra Part II.C. and Part III.D.2.
386. Quinn, supra note 16.f
387. Id.
388. See supra Part II.C.
389. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–31.
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patented drug is actually invalid.390 Because the reverse payment
agreement halts the ANDA litigation before its completion, the
determination of that drug patent’s validity remains unresolved in
perpetuity.391 Reverse payment agreements also created a problem called
“exclusivity parking” where the generic brand that was first to file
refrained from entering the market as a result of the reverse payment,
thereby making other generic brands wait until 180-day exclusivity
ended.392
To solve this problem, several ideas have been implemented or
proposed to fix the incentive system within the Hatch-Waxman Act so
that adjudication of a patent’s validity is completed. First, Congress tried
to rectify the problem by creating a failure-to-market provision for the
generic brand that is the first to file an ANDA. 393 Essentially, the failureto-market provision dictates that a generic brand can forfeit the 180-day
exclusivity right “in one of the ways specified by statute.” 394 One of the
ways that can “trigger” the forfeiture provision is if a subsequent
paragraph IV filer sees the patent validity litigation to its completion. 395
The provisions would force a first filer to either choose to market their
generic drug within 75 days or lose its 180-day exclusivity.396 However,
this provision failed because the poorly drafted language “leaves a
pioneer and first filer almost completely in control and able to thwart
Congress’s goals.”397
As a solution to the forfeiture provision’s ineffectiveness, two
comments, one by Brian T. Apel and the other by Jaimin Shah, agree that
a statutory amendment to the Hatch-Waxman should be made to allow
IPR challenges of drug patents to trigger the forfeiture provision,
effectively using the quick adjudicating procedures of IPR to force generic
first filers to choose to market a generic drug or forfeit the 180-day
exclusivity and allow other generic brands to enter the market. 398 For
clarity, my comment’s purpose and proposal do not seek to argue against
these solutions. It presents them merely to distinguish what this
comment is trying to accomplish in preventing the harm caused by
anticompetitive reverse payment agreements, which is to completely
overhaul the Hatch-Waxman system.
The first part of overhauling the system is to create a brand-new
paragraph V challenge. Essentially, IPR will no longer apply to drug
patents and USPTO will not have jurisdiction over drug patent challenges.
390. Id. at 2228 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)).
391. Id. at 2231.
392. Apel, supra note 201, at 109.
393. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D) (2016).
394. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)).
395. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2016). Congress rejected an amendment that
would have changed the award of the 180-day exclusivity period to the first successful
challenger instead of the first to file. Apel, supra note 201, at 114 n.85.
396. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2016).
397. See Apel, supra note 201, at 120. For a more detailed discussion of how the failure
to market provision failed to curb exclusivity parking, see Apel, supra note 201, at 120–23.
398. Id. at 124, 132; Shah, supra note 201, at 469–74.
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That will fall on the newly created DPAA, the agency that will also work
both with the FDA and FTC to monitor ANDA litigation and antitrust
enforcement, respectively. The DPAA would handle paragraph IV and V
challenges, but mirror the procedures as if they were brought in federal
court and an administrative court. Hence, paragraph V will mirror IPR in
almost every way,399 and as in the Apel and Shah comments, language in
the Act will allow paragraph V to trigger the forfeiture provision against
a first filer. However, my proposal goes a step further in providing greater
incentives to parties to successfully complete litigation. Frankly, this
proposal’s goal is to do for the Hatch-Waxman Act what the AIA did for
patent law with IPR.
First, paragraph V will be available to a first to file or the next
subsequent filer and grant the party who succeeds in invalidating a drug
patent, a period of exclusivity of forty-five to ninety days or less.400 An
exclusivity period is probably one of the most ingenious ways to
incentivize parties to litigate, creating a prize at the end of the litigating
road.401 Paragraphs I–III are considered useless word fillers in the HatchWaxman Act because generic drug companies that are not the first to file
do not gain that 180-day incentive to challenge a drug patent. 402 By
creating a brand new paragraph V challenge that mirrors IPR, generic
drug companies can take advantage of a system is at a relatively low cost,
quickly decided, and does not subject them to infringement claims. The
paragraph V challenge would reflect a lower exclusivity period, because
one can pay more and taker higher risk under paragraph IV challenge to
get the longer and more financially beneficial 180-day market exclusivity.
Although I would retain paragraph IV’s first to file system, the
exclusivity period awarded under a paragraph V challenge would go to
the first successful filer.403 This creates an added risk that the exclusivity
can pass on to another paragraph V challenger who does not settle. 404
Also, it forces any brand name that wants to enter into an agreement to
consider having to “buy off” too many challengers, a consequence that the
Court found was lacking in the present form of the Act. 405 Any generic can
399. Paragraph V will not have an institution review like IPR does under the AIA. See
35. U.S.C. § 314.
400. I started with an exclusivity period that is half of what a first filer would get under
a paragraph IV challenge, but it could be less. The idea is to have some kind of number that
would appropriately reflect the risk in challenging a drug patent.
401. The exclusivity period can potentially make 60% to 80% of a generic brand’s
potential profit. See Apel, supra note 201, at 113 n.57.
402. Id. (without IPR, “no [generic drug company] wants to pay for the [paragraph I–III
certifications] where the results will wind up benefitting many free riders that did not fund
the litigation.”).
403. Taking from what Sen. Hatch suggested under certain drafts of the MMA. See supra
note 394. With the aforementioned forfeiture provision, I would suggest that paragraph V
challenges could end the FDA’s thirty-month stay when a paragraph IV challenge is
successful.
404. DORSNEY, supra note 42, at 17.
405. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (finding that two special features of Hatch-Waxman
prevent a brand name from having to pay off multiple challengers: (1) only the first
challenger gains the 180-day market exclusivity, and (2) a subsequent paragraph IV filer
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choose to start with either a paragraph IV or V challenge. While there is
only one first to file under paragraph IV, paragraph V may still be
available if there is no successful challenge.
A lack of Article III standing is one of the benefits of IPR, which
allows any third party that is not a drug company to challenge. 406 This
option will still be available in paragraph V, albeit with a caveat. Any party
that is not a drug company, which files a paragraph V, must do so in
tandem (via joinder) with a generic brand. Hence, a third party nongeneric could foot the bill, and a participating generic, added as a coparty, would receive the benefit of the exclusivity period upon the
challenge’s completion. This also addresses the issue that non-generic
entities or parties, like CFAD, would face when they are denied appellate
review of a PTAB IPR final written decision because they lack an
identifiable injury to stand in the Federal Circuit. 407
Settlements, in the form of reverse payment agreements, will still be
allowed under the new regime, and may occur between brand names and
generic brands that either file a paragraph IV or paragraph V challenge.
Although there is “a general legal policy favoring the settlement of
disputes,” the Supreme Court recognized that reverse payment
agreements are an “unusual” form of settlement. 408 In fact, the Court cited
Trinko finding that competitors that come together and agree not
compete appears like some type of collusion. 409 But, the Court did not find
reverse payment agreements to be per se or presumptively illegal, finding
that the “anticompetitive consequences” of a reverse payment agreement
are not always “unjustified.”410 In fact, some have argued that reverse
payment agreements can be pro-competitive.411 The Court even indicated
five guidelines to help courts determine the legality of a reverse payment
agreement.412 However, I propose an additional consideration, or a duty
required under the Hatch-Waxman Act.

will have to wait the statutory directed thirty-month stay period, “removing the most
motivated challenger and the one closest to introducing competition.”).
406. See supra Part II.B.2.
407. See Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., No. 2016-1544 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2017)
(dismissing appellants case for lack of standing and stating that the right to appeal a PTAB
final written decision does not give Article III standing); see generally Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins,
136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016); see Kamholz, supra note 328. “Probably the only way out of
this problem would be for the no-standing petitioner to achieve joinder with a party having
standing and then to backseat-drive the joint appeal.” Id.
408. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231, 2234.
409. Id. at 2233.
410. Id. at 2235–37.
411. See generally Andrew E. Podgorny, Note, Supporting the Rationale Behind the
Hatch-Waxman Act and Patent Law: How Reverse Payment Settlements under FTC v. Actavis
Can Be Procompetitive, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 423, 455 (2015) (stating that a payment may
be justified if it helps a generic brands to develop other drugs to benefit the public);
Compton, supra note 194, at 396–97 (finding that ANDA success rates for generic brands
hover at 48% in contrast to 67% of the generic brands that enter the market due to terms
of reverse payment agreements that allow them to enter before the patent expires).
412. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–37.
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Under this new Hatch-Waxman regime, I propose that new language
in the Act should be included to require a limitation on the number or
frequency of reverse payment agreements that are allowable for a
particular patented drug. This shall be known as the “limited right to
settle” provision. This is not a difficult feat to accomplish. The Court in
Trinko recognized that the 1996 Act imposed a sharing requirement
between competitors, and penalties were assessed to parties who
breached this duty.413 The “limited right to settle” would have the
opposite effect, limiting the interactions between brand name and
generic brands, decreasing the opportunities where these agreements
may “facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion.”414
One helpful gauge to determine when this “limited right to settle”
would end is to look at a brand name’s investment in a challenged
patented drug. For example, one pro-competitive benefit that may arise
from a reverse payment agreement is when a settlement secures profits
for a brand name and allows it to recoup NDA and patent expenditures. 415
This allows the brand name to funnel those profits into research and
development costs to further pharmaceutical innovation. 416 Thus, a
“limited right to settle” may end when a brand name recoups its
investment in the drug it developed. This should help quell the fear that
exposure to multiple forms of patent invalidation or general liability
under IPR, ANDA, and antitrust law will deter current and potential drug
industry investors, which will lead to less money for research,
development, and drug innovation.417
The proposal section of this comment favors bringing generic drugs
to market. Amending the Hatch-Waxman Act with these changes can aid
in bringing the intended purpose of Hatch-Waxman back to its prominent
role: facilitating the entry of low-cost generic drugs to market. But this
proposal does reflect a compromise. The following section will describe
how the DPAA, will enforce the new aforementioned provisions and the
new remedial scheme that is designed to benefit the pharmaceutical
industry.

C. USPTO Rule and the Telecommunication Act
Remedial Framework Can Be a Model to Create an Effective
Remedy Section for the Hatch-Waxman Act
Prior to Actavis, it was posited that the principles of Trinko and the
1996 Act’s regulatory scheme could be applied to Hatch-Waxman’s
reverse payment agreement problem. 418 Professor Michael A. Carrier
413. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412–13 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(A) (2016)).
414. Id. at 408.
415. Compton, supra note 194, at 393–95.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 399–401.
418. See Michael A. Carrier, Review, Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the
Power of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law: Innovation for the 21st Century: A Response
to Seven Critics, 61 ALA. L. REV. 597, 614–15 (2010); see generally Shashank Upadhye and
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noted that there was some doubt as to whether the U.S. Supreme Court
would apply these principles, or if the financial penalties were severe
enough to sway regime violators.419 However, my proposal differs in the
following key aspect: while the above scholar asserted that courts should
“direct some inquiry to the effectiveness of the regulatory regime” in
whether antitrust scrutiny should apply to reverse payment agreements,
I suggest amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to include a new remedy
scheme to the Act, not unlike the remedies found in the 1996 Act, to
financially punish violators who use reverse payment agreements to
undermine Hatch-Waxman’s purpose.
The argument of whether financial penalties or the use of remedial
measures on multi-billion-dollar drug companies is enough to curb illegal
reverse payment agreements is valid. However, the Court in Trinko
pointed to the fact that the 1996 Act created a duty that was not only
already expensive for incumbents on the forced sharing level, but which
cost added up when incumbents breached that duty. 420
There is nothing that forces litigants, under the Hatch-Waxman Act,
to undergo a reverse payment settlement. The “limited right to settle”
implemented by my proposal in the previous section is just an assurance
that the number of settlements between brand names and generics do not
violate the pro-competitive purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act. But that
provision, coupled with the looming prospect of financial loss by forgoing
market exclusivity granted by a paragraph IV or paragraph V challenge,
in addition to financial penalties421 under the Act, may be sufficient to
preserve Hatch-Waxman’s purpose. Hence, the combination of a new
remedial scheme that still exposes violators to possible antitrust scrutiny,
in addition to implementing new incentives, can be enough to incentivize
brand name drug companies or “first filers to refrain from entering into
[illegal] [reverse payment] settlement[s] in the first instance.” 422
While Professor Rebecca S. Eisenberg and Dean Daniel L. Crane
suggest that the FDA should take on the responsibility of adjudicating
pharmaceutical patent approval and generic drug market entry because
of their familiarity and more technical expertise in the subject matter, 423
Braden Lang, Article, The FDA and Patent, Antitrust, and Property Takings Laws: Strange
Bedfellows Useful to Unblock Access to Blocked Drugs, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 84, 88, 100–08
(using the essential facilities doctrine described in Trinko to prevent delays in the generic
drug market caused by Risk Evaluation & Mitigation Strategies).
419. Id.
420. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414. “Amici States have filed a brief asserting that competitive
LECs are threatened with ‘death by a thousand cuts. . . .’” Id.
421. See Part IV.A. and see Trinko, 540 U.S. at 403–04 (“Verizon undertook to make a
‘voluntary contribution’ to the U.S. Treasury in the amount of $3 million; under the PSC
orders, Verizon incurred liability to the competitive LECs in the amount of $10 million.”
(citations omitted)).
422. Shah, supra note 201, at 463.
423. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg and Daniel L. Crane, Article, Patent Punting: How
FDA and Antitrust Courts Undermine the Hatch-Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents,
21 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 197 (2015) (“With proper staffing and resources, FDA could
use its expertise in drug regulation to make rough assessments of the relationship between
particular patents and the scope of FDA approval in NDAs and ANDAs quickly and cheaply,
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I propose a new agency, the DPAA, should be created to manage this new
Hatch-Waxman Regulatory Regime. This agency will take on the
responsibility and work with the FDA during paragraph IV or newly
created paragraph V challenges. The DPAA will also work with FTC, DOJ,
and state antitrust agencies to monitor the legality of reverse payment
agreements and institute financial penalties provided under the Act, or
pursue further antitrust liability if necessary.
Because Kyle Bass and his “short activist strategy” helped inspire the
creation of this proposed new Hatch-Waxman system, it is only fitting
that his strategy undergo scrutiny under the Act. The amendment to the
Act itself could include a provision that makes Kyle Bass’s strategy illegal
under the Act, or a provision could create a section that allows the DPAA
to scrutinize challengers’ actions under the Act. This essentially would be
a “check” on the use of paragraph V challenges. Because paragraph V
mirrors IPR, the DPAA can have that ability to check its implementation.
The AIA grants USPTO broad authority to prescribe regulations over
the entire USPTO and its proceedings:
The America Invents Act grants the USPTO a dizzying array of new powers,
including powers to set forth standards and procedures for the institution
of its proceedings, to set forth standards and procedures for discovery of
relevant evidence, to specify when parties may amend or supplement their
patents, to prescribe sanctions for abuses in discovery, and to define certain
ambiguous terms.424

Like USPTO’s power under the AIA, I propose similar language that
would allow the DPAA to create the proper procedures and regulatory
standards needed to conform to the pharmaceutical industry, using the
1996 Act an example. Additionally, the AIA granted “USPTO broad
regulatory authority to create and improve” post-patent issuance review
proceedings such as IPR.425 Thus, regarding paragraph V proceedings, the
DPAA would be given the power to proscribe regulations or “sanctions
for abuse of discovery, abuse of process, or any other improper use of the
proceeding, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or an
unnecessary increase in the cost of the proceeding.” 426 These remedies
should be sufficient to punish any Act violator.
Creating a new regulatory scheme although, complicated on its own,
is nothing if cannot be accepted and implemented by the parties who will
participate in this new scheme. My Argument for why the pharmaceutical
industry would agree to and participate in this new Hatch-Waxman
regulatory scheme is described below.

while leaving patent infringement remedies intact.”).
424. See Tran, supra note 90, at 611.
425. See generally Michelle K. Lee, PTAB Update: Proposed Changes to Rules Governing
PTAB Trial Proceedings, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: A BLOG FROM USPTO’S LEADERSHIP (Aug. 19, 2015),
www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/ptab_update_proposed_changes_to.
426. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(6).
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D. Why Should Big Pharma Accept This
Hatch-Waxman Amendment?
The first reason is obvious. These amendments to the HatchWaxman Act allow the Act to remain faithful to its original purpose of
providing low-cost generic drugs to the public.427 An FTC report from
2010 estimated that reverse payment agreements resulted in over $3
billion in higher prescription drug prices for Americans.428 Similar to the
purpose of the 1996 Act, these proposed new amendments to the HatchWaxman Act are meant to “uproot” the anticompetitive harm reverse
payment agreements have on healthcare. 429
While recent talk from the new White House administration is
focused on overhauling or streamlining “FDA operations to speed up
approval decisions on new drugs and medical products[,]” 430 this ideally
would materialize more quickly by creating a new regulatory scheme that
is directed by a new administrative agency. That new drug agency would
then work with the drug industry, the FDA, and FTC on delivering lowcost generic drugs to the public. In 2015, the FDA reported a backlog of
approximately three thousand ANDA applications, and approval time that
went from thirty months in 2011, to forty-eight months in 2014.431
Creating a new agency that that focuses on alleviating ANDA backlogs that
results in lower cost drugs will further Hatch-Waxman’s purpose.
Also, the formation of a new system that can result in lower drug
prices can be an important step in repairing the drug industry’s poor
reputation of being profit-mongers, rather an industry that is focused on
improving people’s lives.432
The second reason is that the newly amended Hatch-Waxman Act
would create a new regulatory regime that is exclusive to the
pharmaceutical industry. After Kyle Bass announced and implemented
his “short activist strategy,” the drug industry complained that IPR was
being used for an unintended purpose, and because it was already subject
to the Hatch-Waxman Act, that it should be exempt from the IPR process
altogether.433 But drug industry exemption from IPR without change in
the Hatch-Waxman scheme can be costly because “federal spending
427. See Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (finding that the Hatch-Waxman Act was meant to facilitate the “efficient transition
to a market with low-cost, generic copies of those pioneering inventions at the close of a
patent term.”) (citing Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2002)), rev’d on other grounds, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3106 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2012) (No. 10-844).
428. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 356.
429. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402.
430. Jill Wechsler, Does Pharma Really Want to Overhaul FDA?, PHARMEXEC.COM (Feb. 10,
2017), www.pharmexec.com/does-pharma-really-want-overhaul-fda-1. More recent
statistics indicate that the backlog has decreased to 2,358, but this may be a result of a
decrease in ANDA filings in the past year.
431. Brennan, supra note 361.
432. See Silverman, supra note 26 (“[A] new Harris Poll reported that only 9 percent of
Americans believe drug makers place more value on patients than profits.”).
433. Rumore, supra note 30.
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would increase by $1.3 billion over 10 years because the exemption
would delay” generic drugs that are 90% cheaper than brand-name
drugs.434 Under my proposal, IPR would not be applied to the drug
industry, but would live on as a more agency-controlled and drug
industry-directed paragraph V challenge.435 Further, the remedies
available under the Act should quell the drug industries’ concern about
the unintended consequences of drug patent challenges, or Congress may
simply choose to prohibit drug patent challengers from also employing
Kyle Bass’s “short activist” strategy. 436
The final major reason Big Pharma should advocate for these HatchWaxman changes is because of the major benefits that a self-governing
regulatory regime would have on the drug industry. Specifically, the
lesson learned from Trinko is that having a complex and intricate regime,
like the 1996 Act, creates an island-type presence for the drug industry
that also has several barriers that protect it from liability, or more
specifically, direct antitrust scrutiny.437 In Trinko, the Supreme Court was
reluctant to impose a “new layer of interminable litigation” to the
telecommunication industry because of the complexity of the 1996 Act’s
framework and also because of the available remedies under the Act. 438
Because the newly proposed DPAA would be in charge of the new HatchWaxman regime, working with the FDA and FTC, courts would be
reluctant to review claims or impose legal sanctions on parties that are
already seeking remedies through the Act.
Prior to Actavis, Congress, through amendment, attempted but failed
to create a counteractive provision that would cause generic brands to
forfeit the 180-day exclusivity period for participating in illegal reverse
payment agreement under antitrust law. 439 In Actavis, the U.S. Supreme
Court subjected reverse payment agreements to antitrust scrutiny, 440 and
although Congress could impose antitrust immunity, 441 this immunity
would not serve the purpose of this comment’s proposal. This proposal’s
amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act employs the presence of potential
judicial review to act as a looming specter for violators of the Act, or in
cases in which the Act’s remedies have been exhausted. 442 But, in focusing
on what this proposal is trying to accomplish, the goal is to create a
“regulatory framework” that does would not need judicial enforcement

434. Id.
435. See supra Part IV.B.
436. See supra Part IV.C.
437. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 413.
438. Id.
439. See Apel, supra note 201 at 116–20 (describing how the antitrust provision is
ineffective at curbing exclusivity parking).
440. 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38.
441. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406–07. In Trinko, the Supreme Court determined that
Congress precluded antitrust immunity under section 601(b)(1) of the 1996 Act.
442. My proposal to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act would also include the “antitrustspecific saving clause language” of section 601(b)(1) of the 1996 Act that that states that
“nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify,
impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws.”
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because it functions as a “regulation [that] significantly diminishes the
likelihood of major antitrust harm.”443 Also, because of this proposal’s
creation of a new regulatory agency in the DPAA and a statutorily
imposed “limited right to settle”,444 courts would less apt to intervene
because the proposed amendments would shield them from having to
insert themselves as “central planners,” a role they have sought to
avoid.445
Finally, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the U.S. Supreme Court has directed parties to exhaust
administrative remedies or remedies available by statute before pursuing
judicial review.446 The goal would be for the newly created DPAA,
supported by express language in the amended Act, to take on that
administrative role, and to impose and enforce the appropriate remedies
under the Act, which would need to be exhausted before there is any
opportunity for judicial review.447
This new drug industry regulatory regime is designed to balance the
needs and goals of both drug companies and the public. This proposed
new regime’s design intends to protect pharmaceutical innovation by
instilling confidence in investors, while serving the public by
expeditiously introducing low-cost generic drugs to consumers. Because
of the aforementioned reasons, the drug industry should support the
presented proposal to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act.

V. CONCLUSION
Enacting legislation that excuses Big Pharma from IPR proceedings
is premature and misguided. Kyle Bass and his “short activist” strategy,
while innovative, did nothing but expose prominent issues regarding the
443. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (quoting Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st
Cir. 1990)). Further, the Court indicated that it was of particular importance that there
existed “a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where
such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust
enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws
contemplate such additional scrutiny.” Id. at 411.
444. See supra Part IV.B. Essentially the “limited right to settle” would be enforced by
the DPAA to regulate the frequency and determine the legality reverse payment agreements.
Id.
445. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. In Trinko, the Court was concerned that should they apply
Sherman § 2 principles to enforce the 1996 Act’s sharing requirements, this application
would cause them to be “central planners” and essentially have them “identify[] the proper
price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.” Id.
446. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993). “Where relief is available from an
administrative agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to pursue that avenue of redress
before proceeding to the courts; and until that recourse is exhausted, suit is premature and
must be dismissed.” Id.; see generally Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) “Where
Congress has created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right,
we have, in suits against federal officers, refused to supplement that scheme with one
created by the judiciary.” Id.
447. In Trinko, the Supreme Court aptly stated: “careful account must be taken of the
pervasive federal and state regulation characteristic of the industry.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411
(quoting United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 91 (1975)).
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current Hatch-Waxman Act. Hatch-Waxman’s original value lied with
providing the proper incentives for generic companies to compete with
brand name companies. But reverse payment agreements diminished
those incentives. Congress has tried to revitalize those incentives to no
avail, and the U.S. Supreme Court made reverse payment agreements
subject to antitrust scrutiny.
Instead, Big Pharma should work with Congress to thoroughly
amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to not only implement new incentives, but
also create a new regulatory scheme for the drug industry. Although IPR
itself would not be directed at the drug industry, the spirit of IPR, under
the guise of a brand-new paragraph V challenge, will help re-incentivize
generic brands to file ANDAs and see them to completion. Although
settlements under the Act will not be discouraged, a new regulatory
agency created under the amended Act, the DPAA, armed with new
language that creates a “limited right to settle,” creates a remedial scheme
that not only regulates reverse payment agreements, but also allows it to
discipline parties for violations under the Act. Additionally, Congress, if it
so chooses, may prohibit those parties who file drug patent challenges
from employing the Kyle Bass “short activist strategy”, or at least create
language in the Act that gives the DPAA the power and discretion to
penalize parties who try and file meritless lawsuits employing Bass’s
shorting strategy.
This proposal’s amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act is a logical
compromise. It is a compromise that would create a complex
administrative regulatory framework that protects the drug industries’
financial investments from direct judicial scrutiny, while serving the
important purpose of ensuring that low-cost generic drugs are available
to consumers to alleviate nationwide healthcare costs.
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